I don’t know of a standard name—maybe you could call it the problem of asymmetric feedback?
This gets discussed in various contexts—for instance, Marcel Zeelenberg has written about the role of feedback in regret aversion. Suppose you have a choice between a sure thing (win $10) and a risky gamble (50% chance you win $20, 50% chance you get nothing). If you choose the risky gamble and you lose then you’ll know for certain that the other option would’ve been better, which makes you feel regret. But if you choose the sure thing, that typically means that you’ll never know how the other option would have turned out (maybe you would’ve won $20 but maybe you would’ve gotten nothing), so you won’t feel much regret. The risky option produces more expected regret than the safe option, and so regret aversion leads people to prefer the safe option. Zeelenberg and colleagues (1996) showed this by varying what feedback people got: if we arrange it so that you’ll get feedback about the risky gamble regardless of what choice you make, then choosing the sure thing won’t help you avoid regret (since it also carries a 50% chance of finding out that the other option would’ve been better), and indeed a lower percentage of people chose the sure thing when they were guaranteed to get feedback regardless of their choice.
I don’t know of a standard name—maybe you could call it the problem of asymmetric feedback?
This gets discussed in various contexts—for instance, Marcel Zeelenberg has written about the role of feedback in regret aversion. Suppose you have a choice between a sure thing (win $10) and a risky gamble (50% chance you win $20, 50% chance you get nothing). If you choose the risky gamble and you lose then you’ll know for certain that the other option would’ve been better, which makes you feel regret. But if you choose the sure thing, that typically means that you’ll never know how the other option would have turned out (maybe you would’ve won $20 but maybe you would’ve gotten nothing), so you won’t feel much regret. The risky option produces more expected regret than the safe option, and so regret aversion leads people to prefer the safe option. Zeelenberg and colleagues (1996) showed this by varying what feedback people got: if we arrange it so that you’ll get feedback about the risky gamble regardless of what choice you make, then choosing the sure thing won’t help you avoid regret (since it also carries a 50% chance of finding out that the other option would’ve been better), and indeed a lower percentage of people chose the sure thing when they were guaranteed to get feedback regardless of their choice.