Any belief you have about the nature of reality, that does not inform your anticipations in any way, is meaningless. It’s like believing in a god which can never be discovered. Good for you, but if the universe will play out exactly the same as if it wasn’t there, why should I care?
Furthermore, why posit the existence of such a thing at all?
Any belief you have about the nature of reality, that does not inform your anticipations in any way, is meaningless.
On a tangent—I think the subjectivist flavor of that is unfortunate. You’re echoing Eliezer’s Making Beliefs Pay Rent, but the anticipations that he’s talking about are “anticipations of sensory experience”. Ultimately, we are subject to natural selection, so maybe a more important rent to pay than anticipation of sensory experiences, is not being removed from the gene pool. So we might instead say, “any belief you have about the nature of reality, that does not improve your chances of survival in any way, is meaningless.”
Elsewhere, in his article on Newcomb’s paradox, Eliezer says:
I don’t generally disagree with anything you wrote. Perhaps we miscommunicated.
“any belief you have about the nature of reality, that does not improve your chances of survival in any way, is meaningless.”
I think that would depend on how one uses “meaningless” but I appreciate wholeheartedly the sentiment that a rational agent wins, with the caveat that winning can mean something very different for various agents.
Moral beliefs aren’t beliefs about moral facts out there in reality, they are beliefs about what I should do next. “What should I do” is an orthogonal question to “what can I expect if I do X”. Since I can reason morally, I am hardly positing anything without warrant.
It doesn’t work like the empiricism you are used to because it is, in broad brush strokes, a different thing that solves a different problem.
Can you recognize that from my position it doesn’t work like the empiricism I’m used to because it’s almost entirely nonsensical appeals to nothing, arguing by definitions, and the exercising of the blind muscles of eld philosophy?
I am unpersuaded that there exists a set of correct preferences. You have, as far as I can see, made no effort to persuade me, but rather just repeatedly asserted that there are and asked me questions in terms that you refuse to define. I am not sure what you want from me in this case.
You may be entirely of the opinion that it is all stuff and nonsense: I am only interested in what can be rationally argued.
I don’t think you think it works like empiricism. I think you have tried to make it work
like empiricism and then given up. “I have a hammer in my hand, and it
won’t work on this ‘screw’ of yours, so you should discard it”.
People can and reason about what preferences they should have, and such reasoning can be as objective as mathematical reasoning, without the need for a special arena of objects.
Any belief you have about the nature of reality, that does not inform your anticipations in any way, is meaningless. It’s like believing in a god which can never be discovered. Good for you, but if the universe will play out exactly the same as if it wasn’t there, why should I care?
Furthermore, why posit the existence of such a thing at all?
On a tangent—I think the subjectivist flavor of that is unfortunate. You’re echoing Eliezer’s Making Beliefs Pay Rent, but the anticipations that he’s talking about are “anticipations of sensory experience”. Ultimately, we are subject to natural selection, so maybe a more important rent to pay than anticipation of sensory experiences, is not being removed from the gene pool. So we might instead say, “any belief you have about the nature of reality, that does not improve your chances of survival in any way, is meaningless.”
Elsewhere, in his article on Newcomb’s paradox, Eliezer says:
Survival is ultimate victory.
I don’t generally disagree with anything you wrote. Perhaps we miscommunicated.
I think that would depend on how one uses “meaningless” but I appreciate wholeheartedly the sentiment that a rational agent wins, with the caveat that winning can mean something very different for various agents.
Moral beliefs aren’t beliefs about moral facts out there in reality, they are beliefs about what I should do next. “What should I do” is an orthogonal question to “what can I expect if I do X”. Since I can reason morally, I am hardly positing anything without warrant.
You just bundled up the whole issue, shoved it inside the word “should” and acted like it had been resolved.
I have stated several times that the whole issue has not been resolved. All I’m doing at the moment is refuting your over-hasty generalisation that:
“morality doesn’t work like empirical prediction, so ditch the whole thing”.
It doesn’t work like the empiricism you are used to because it is, in broad brush strokes, a different thing that solves a different problem.
Can you recognize that from my position it doesn’t work like the empiricism I’m used to because it’s almost entirely nonsensical appeals to nothing, arguing by definitions, and the exercising of the blind muscles of eld philosophy?
I am unpersuaded that there exists a set of correct preferences. You have, as far as I can see, made no effort to persuade me, but rather just repeatedly asserted that there are and asked me questions in terms that you refuse to define. I am not sure what you want from me in this case.
Why should I accept your bald assertions here?
You may be entirely of the opinion that it is all stuff and nonsense: I am only interested in what can be rationally argued.
I don’t think you think it works like empiricism. I think you have tried to make it work like empiricism and then given up. “I have a hammer in my hand, and it won’t work on this ‘screw’ of yours, so you should discard it”.
People can and reason about what preferences they should have, and such reasoning can be as objective as mathematical reasoning, without the need for a special arena of objects.