While it wouldn’t be ideal for international security, middle powers will also probably feel a lot of pressure to acquire and commit to using weapons of mass destruction. It’s probably much cheaper to develop powerful weapons and elaborate fail-deadlies than it is to kickstart your own AI infrastructure (particuarly if it’s viable to steal Chinese/American models), so it’s attractive to bank on staying geopolitically relevant through deterrence instead of having to coordinate.
I think this is particularly likely to happen in worlds where misalignment isn’t seen as omnicidal, and where the primary perceived risk is loss of sovereignty. Since being part of a coalition itself erodes some sovereignty (especially one that carries security commitments), it might seem easier to turn investment inwards.
While it wouldn’t be ideal for international security, middle powers will also probably feel a lot of pressure to acquire and commit to using weapons of mass destruction. It’s probably much cheaper to develop powerful weapons and elaborate fail-deadlies than it is to kickstart your own AI infrastructure (particuarly if it’s viable to steal Chinese/American models), so it’s attractive to bank on staying geopolitically relevant through deterrence instead of having to coordinate.
I think this is particularly likely to happen in worlds where misalignment isn’t seen as omnicidal, and where the primary perceived risk is loss of sovereignty. Since being part of a coalition itself erodes some sovereignty (especially one that carries security commitments), it might seem easier to turn investment inwards.