1 presumes that minimalist descriptions of superficially-visible output are all you need to reconstruct the actual drivers behind the behavior. 2 presumes that the evolutionarily-shared neural architecture and its basic components of perception, cognition and soforth are not seperated by a barrier of magical reality fluid.
Ah. If you’re saying that 1) implies lesser internal machinery than 2), and that the internal machinery (cognition and soforth) is what’s important, then I agree.
The problem I think is just that, to me, they both sound to me like perfectly reasonable (if vague) descriptions of complex, sentient human pain. It seemed like you were saying nociceptors and subroutines were incapable of producing pain and startlement.
The problem I think is just that, to me, they both sound to me like perfectly reasonable (if vague) descriptions of complex, sentient human pain.
1 sounds to me like an attempt to capture output in the form of a flowchart. It’s like trying to describe the flocking behavior of birds by reference to the Boids cellular automaton—and insisting not that there are similar principles at work in how the birds go about solving the problem of flocking, but that birds literally run an instance of Boids in their heads and that’s all there is to their flocking behavior.
1)”Nociceptor activation threshold met; initiate yowl-and-run subroutine.” 2)She does it because it’s painful and it startled her.
What’s the difference between 1 and 2?
1 presumes that minimalist descriptions of superficially-visible output are all you need to reconstruct the actual drivers behind the behavior. 2 presumes that the evolutionarily-shared neural architecture and its basic components of perception, cognition and soforth are not seperated by a barrier of magical reality fluid.
Ah. If you’re saying that 1) implies lesser internal machinery than 2), and that the internal machinery (cognition and soforth) is what’s important, then I agree.
The problem I think is just that, to me, they both sound to me like perfectly reasonable (if vague) descriptions of complex, sentient human pain. It seemed like you were saying nociceptors and subroutines were incapable of producing pain and startlement.
1 sounds to me like an attempt to capture output in the form of a flowchart. It’s like trying to describe the flocking behavior of birds by reference to the Boids cellular automaton—and insisting not that there are similar principles at work in how the birds go about solving the problem of flocking, but that birds literally run an instance of Boids in their heads and that’s all there is to their flocking behavior.