I was thinking along the same lines, then saw your comment. I suspect an issue can’t really become “popular” without some some signaling or wishful thinking involved.
Probability of a major earthquake in California this year? High, if you hope those damnfool leftcoasters are finally going to get what’s coming to them. Low, if you have a lot of money tied up in property in California.
Almost everything seems to serve for signaling at least somewhat.
Even with my example, which I think seems to have an unusually dense combination of commonality of being asked, how fun or interesting it seems, and how impartial or non-partisan the answer would be, you could certainly still signal being pessimistic by saying no, or all futuristic or something by saying yes, or whatever.
I think the point would be less to find something that wouldn’t serve for signaling at all, and more to come up with something that would be the least infected with the most mind-killing sort of signaling. Anything sufficiently interesting and common probably has at least some non-trivial signaling incentives.
Is it even possible to have an open question that lots of people would understand that wouldn’t serve for signaling?
I was thinking along the same lines, then saw your comment. I suspect an issue can’t really become “popular” without some some signaling or wishful thinking involved.
Probability of a major earthquake in California this year? High, if you hope those damnfool leftcoasters are finally going to get what’s coming to them. Low, if you have a lot of money tied up in property in California.
Almost everything seems to serve for signaling at least somewhat.
Even with my example, which I think seems to have an unusually dense combination of commonality of being asked, how fun or interesting it seems, and how impartial or non-partisan the answer would be, you could certainly still signal being pessimistic by saying no, or all futuristic or something by saying yes, or whatever.
I think the point would be less to find something that wouldn’t serve for signaling at all, and more to come up with something that would be the least infected with the most mind-killing sort of signaling. Anything sufficiently interesting and common probably has at least some non-trivial signaling incentives.