It should if we assume the interests of their bosses are not the same as the interests of the readers. Assume that, say, cutting the taxes of the rich will lose me five utilons, but give their bosses that many. If they’re trying to persuade me to support tax cuts for the rich, then predicting a loss of utilons for me will make it less likely that I support it. However, saying it will give me more utilons will make it more likely that I support it.
For them to be actively anti-correlated with correctness, then, we only have to assume that the boss’ interests are actively anti-correlated with those of the readers.
But the claim that the boss’ interest are actively anti-correlated with readers is an incredibly strong claim itself. In the vast majority of contexts this won’t be true. Who benefits if new technologies are discovered? Who suffers if there’s a nuclear war or if we reach peak oil faster than generally anticipated?
It is conceivable that within the narrow confines of what the WSJ editorials generally discuss there’s an anti-correlation. But even that set of narrow topics is pretty wide. To the point where this seems unlikely. It seems more likely to me that there might be specific ideologies which in their narrow realm are anti-correlated with truths about controversial questions. But to construct explicit unambiguous examples of that even in economics I need to do something like select merchantilism as the relevant economic theory.
I agree it’s a strong claim, but I can see a mechanism that makes it a little more plausible. Where the owners of WSJ have the same interests as their readers, the WSJ need not write about it because the readers will do what is in their mutual interests. It is only when their interests are opposed that the WSJ has to work to persuade them to work against their own interests and for Murdoch’s interests.
It should if we assume the interests of their bosses are not the same as the interests of the readers. Assume that, say, cutting the taxes of the rich will lose me five utilons, but give their bosses that many. If they’re trying to persuade me to support tax cuts for the rich, then predicting a loss of utilons for me will make it less likely that I support it. However, saying it will give me more utilons will make it more likely that I support it.
For them to be actively anti-correlated with correctness, then, we only have to assume that the boss’ interests are actively anti-correlated with those of the readers.
But the claim that the boss’ interest are actively anti-correlated with readers is an incredibly strong claim itself. In the vast majority of contexts this won’t be true. Who benefits if new technologies are discovered? Who suffers if there’s a nuclear war or if we reach peak oil faster than generally anticipated?
It is conceivable that within the narrow confines of what the WSJ editorials generally discuss there’s an anti-correlation. But even that set of narrow topics is pretty wide. To the point where this seems unlikely. It seems more likely to me that there might be specific ideologies which in their narrow realm are anti-correlated with truths about controversial questions. But to construct explicit unambiguous examples of that even in economics I need to do something like select merchantilism as the relevant economic theory.
I agree it’s a strong claim, but I can see a mechanism that makes it a little more plausible. Where the owners of WSJ have the same interests as their readers, the WSJ need not write about it because the readers will do what is in their mutual interests. It is only when their interests are opposed that the WSJ has to work to persuade them to work against their own interests and for Murdoch’s interests.