A link to Gowder’s argument would be a good thing to have here. Never mind, I found it.
Some of what you’re saying here makes me think that the post about Nature vs. Nature (that might not be the exact title but it was something similar) would be more relevant to his argument. He might be contending that you’re trying to use intuitions which presume utilitarianism to justify utilitarianism, but you’re ignoring other intuitions such as scope insensitivity. Scope insensitivity is only a problem if we presume utilitarianism correct. If we presume scope insensitivity correct then utilitarianism would become the problem.
So the dilemma is how we weigh competing intuitions against each other. There are definitely reasons that utilitarianism should win this fight, but since you don’t identify a mechanism for weighing utilitarian intuitions against stupid human intuitions it’s tough to say that this post does anything to address the hypothetical Gowder argument which Gowder may or may not have made.
Specifically, this part highlights the underlying conflict of intuitions well:
But that’s for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided—at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. When you’ve reflected on enough intuitions, and corrected enough absurdities, you start to see a common denominator, a meta-principle at work, which one might phrase as “Shut up and multiply.”
Where music is concerned, I care about the journey.
When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply.
It’s never explained why shutting up and multiplying should trump the value of the journey, or why that uniquely applies when life is at stake. The rules of logic don’t go away whenever lives are in danger, so it feels very ad hoc without the identification of a specific weighing mechanism or process that determines when we should care about the journey and when we should care about multiplication.
To be clear, I like utilitarianism, but this post doesn’t do much to support its intuitions over my deontic intuitions. Which intutions are the meta intuitions that we should use to weigh other intuitions against each other? Are these meta intuitions justified? These are questions that should be answered if you’re talking about why utilitarian intuitions should be preferred to other intuitions.
Even if this isn’t what Gowder argued, I’m still curious about how these questions would be answered by EY or by anyone else who wants to try to answer them. And I still would like a link to Gowder’s argument, whatever it might be. Ignore that, sorry. Please just mentally eliminate all the references I made to Gowder. Thanks.
A link to Gowder’s argument would be a good thing to have here. Never mind, I found it.
Some of what you’re saying here makes me think that the post about Nature vs. Nature (that might not be the exact title but it was something similar) would be more relevant to his argument. He might be contending that you’re trying to use intuitions which presume utilitarianism to justify utilitarianism, but you’re ignoring other intuitions such as scope insensitivity. Scope insensitivity is only a problem if we presume utilitarianism correct. If we presume scope insensitivity correct then utilitarianism would become the problem.
So the dilemma is how we weigh competing intuitions against each other. There are definitely reasons that utilitarianism should win this fight, but since you don’t identify a mechanism for weighing utilitarian intuitions against stupid human intuitions it’s tough to say that this post does anything to address the hypothetical Gowder argument which Gowder may or may not have made.
Specifically, this part highlights the underlying conflict of intuitions well:
It’s never explained why shutting up and multiplying should trump the value of the journey, or why that uniquely applies when life is at stake. The rules of logic don’t go away whenever lives are in danger, so it feels very ad hoc without the identification of a specific weighing mechanism or process that determines when we should care about the journey and when we should care about multiplication.
To be clear, I like utilitarianism, but this post doesn’t do much to support its intuitions over my deontic intuitions. Which intutions are the meta intuitions that we should use to weigh other intuitions against each other? Are these meta intuitions justified? These are questions that should be answered if you’re talking about why utilitarian intuitions should be preferred to other intuitions.
Even if this isn’t what Gowder argued, I’m still curious about how these questions would be answered by EY or by anyone else who wants to try to answer them. And I still would like a link to Gowder’s argument, whatever it might be. Ignore that, sorry. Please just mentally eliminate all the references I made to Gowder. Thanks.