it seems to be that there’s an underlying variation of disposition that makes lying easier for some people, and truth-telling easier for others.
When I want to come up with a speech-act to accomplish a certain goal, the plans my mind generates are ones that accomplish the goal by informing people of reasons for it. If I want to conceal some information from others, that’s an additional constraint that’s not natural for me to think of. (...) By contrast, if I found it more natural to think of the people around me as social objects whose levers can be worked by my words, I’d be better at social manipulation and affiliation, but worse at transferring nonsocial information or evaluating arguments.
My working hypothesis is that some people mainly perceive their environment as one in which words have meanings, while for others speech-acts are primarily construed as social moves. If you’re in the first group, you imagine that people are tracking honesty of attempts to inform in a way that contributes to your reputation. If you’re in the second, you might think that they’re mainly interpreting your words as a statement about your current posture and intent.
(...) it really does seem to me that our society has engaged in a long campaign to deny the existence of people who believe that words have meanings, and have opinions about facts, and think about the exact nature of the obligation before making a promise.
Viliam comments on The Quaker and the Parselmouth