So, that’s an objection that any form of consequentialism has to tackle. I’m not sure why you’re bringing it up here. I thought you were objecting to Rachels’ rejection of superrational reasoning and their objection to the “what if no one had kids?” argument. I endeavored in the grandparent to show that it makes sense, from a superrational perspective, to invite the cable technician over and also to not have children. I am steelmanning Rachels here.
Can you clarify your position?
Er, no, in rule consequentialism there is a reason why you don’t kill a healthy person who happens to be in your hospital to donate their organs to five people who need them, even if no-one is going to find out. See Consequentialism Need Not Be Nearsighted. It’d be a stretch to say that for a cable technician to come over is to defect in a PD-like problem.
We don’t actually disagree here. I said that dilemmas like the transplant problem form the basis of an objection that any form of consequentialism has to tackle, and I agree that rule consequentialism successfully tackles the objection. I think we both agree that there are superrational consequentialisms that also successfully tackle the objection. If you disagree with any of the following:
It’s good for the cable technician to visit.
It’s bad to kill the healthy person.
If one could do more good by donating than by having children, then it’s better to donate.
(1)-(3) fall out of both rule consequentialism and superrationality.
then let’s see where the dispute takes us; otherwise I’ll be happy to tap out of the conversation.
Would you agree with 3′. If one could do more good by donating the healthy person’s organs than by not killing them, then it’s better to do so?
(BTW, I was using “superrationality” and “rule consequentialism” more or less synonymously, but you seem to be taking them to be distinct; what’s the difference?)
I still don’t understand your position; I’m going to respectfully tap out.