I don’t think thermostat consciousness would require homunculi any more than human consciousness does but I think it was a mistake on my part to use the word consciousness as it inevitably complicates things rather than simplifying them (although FWIW I do agree that consciousness exists and is not an epiphenomenon).
For the thermostat (assuming the bimetallic strip type), the reference is the position of a pair of contacts either side of the strip, the temperature causes the curvature of the strip, which makes or breaks the contacts, which turns the heating on or off. This is all physically well understood. There is nothing problematic here.
For me acting as the thermostat, I perceive the delta, and act accordingly. I don’t see anything problematic here either. The sage is not above causation, nor subject to causation, but one with causation. As are we all, whether we are sages or not.
The thermostat too is one with causation. The thermostat acts in exactly the same way as you do. I is possibly even already conscious (I had completely forgotten this was an established debate and its absolutely not a crux for me). You are much more complex that a thermostat.
I think there is something a bit misleading about your example of a person regulating temperature in their house manually. The fact that you can consciously implement the control algorithm does not tell us anything about your cognition or even your decision making process since you can also implement pretty much any other algorithm (you are more or less turing complete subject to finiteness etc.). PCT is a theory of cognition, not simply of decision making.
The thermostat acts in exactly the same way as you do. I is possibly even already conscious (I had completely forgotten this was an established debate and its absolutely not a crux for me). You are much more complex that a thermostat.
I don’t think there is any possibility of a thermostat being conscious. The linked article makes the common error of arguing that wherever there is consciousness we see some phenomenon X, therefore wherever there is X there is consciousness, and if there doesn’t seem to be any, htere muste be consciousness “in a sense”.
The fact that you can consciously implement the control algorithm does not tell us anything about your cognition
Of course. The thermostat controls temperature without being conscious; I can by my own conscious actions also choose to perform the thermostat’s role.
Anyway, all this began with my objecting to “agents” performing time travel, and arguing that whether an unconscious thermostat or a conscious entity such as myself controls the temperature, no time travel is involved. Neither do I achieve a goal merely by predicting that it will be achieved, but by acting to achieve it. Are we disagreeing about anything at this point?
I don’t think thermostat consciousness would require homunculi any more than human consciousness does but I think it was a mistake on my part to use the word consciousness as it inevitably complicates things rather than simplifying them (although FWIW I do agree that consciousness exists and is not an epiphenomenon).
The thermostat too is one with causation. The thermostat acts in exactly the same way as you do. I is possibly even already conscious (I had completely forgotten this was an established debate and its absolutely not a crux for me). You are much more complex that a thermostat.
I think there is something a bit misleading about your example of a person regulating temperature in their house manually. The fact that you can consciously implement the control algorithm does not tell us anything about your cognition or even your decision making process since you can also implement pretty much any other algorithm (you are more or less turing complete subject to finiteness etc.). PCT is a theory of cognition, not simply of decision making.
I don’t think there is any possibility of a thermostat being conscious. The linked article makes the common error of arguing that wherever there is consciousness we see some phenomenon X, therefore wherever there is X there is consciousness, and if there doesn’t seem to be any, htere muste be consciousness “in a sense”.
Of course. The thermostat controls temperature without being conscious; I can by my own conscious actions also choose to perform the thermostat’s role.
Anyway, all this began with my objecting to “agents” performing time travel, and arguing that whether an unconscious thermostat or a conscious entity such as myself controls the temperature, no time travel is involved. Neither do I achieve a goal merely by predicting that it will be achieved, but by acting to achieve it. Are we disagreeing about anything at this point?