Take that last point about neo-Nazis, it is exactly like what Orwell said, that there are people who do not understand that others can be motivated by racial frenzy.
Hate groups have been an object of interest to law enforcement and psychologists for some years now. Most members are socially maladjusted and have trouble dealing with their insecurities. The “racial frenzy” arises from group dynamics. It provides group cohesion and gives the members a shared sense of purpose. It may motivate the group action, but it’s not what drew people to the group to begin with.
I did read Orwell’s essay. He makes an excellent point about intellectuals failing to properly understand the powerful emotions that can motivate a group to unified action. I won’t contest the role of group identity and group dynamics. What I wish to examine are the motivations that lead people to associate with hate groups or terrorist networks in the first place.
Similarly you say that when bin Laden condemns American decadence or depravity from an Islamic perspective, that’s just propaganda to advance a political cause. What if it is the other way around? What if bin Laden instead invokes political grievances to advance a religious agenda? You assume that it cant possibly be that, but: Look at that document again—bin Laden goes into the usual rap against America and the West, but what he asks for is submission to Islam, to Shariah. His aim is, in his own words, explicitly theocratic.
Bin Laden himself may or may not have theocratic aims. My point was that without the political grievances, he just becomes some fanatic spouting rhetoric. With political grievances, he has supporters and recruits.
You call this description of bin Laden’s motives “superficial”. Why? Because it isn’t one that is morally intelligible to you. But why should that mean that those motives are wrong? Isn’t it the exact opposite of superficial to think that people are capable of radically differing, and that not everyone is alike?
I call it superficial because it just so happens to align perfectly with our own interests. It demonizes the enemy and provides a casus belli. What it fails to do is answer the question of why radical Islam has become so popular in recent decades.
“Bin Laden himself may or may not have theocratic aims” - May or may not?
“My point was that without the political grievances, he just becomes some fanatic spouting rhetoric. With political grievances, he has supporters and recruits.” Once again, this assumes that his supporters and recruits think in a way that follows yours. I have to just say [citation needed]. Let’s take one example: 99% of Afghans think that the punishment for apostasy should be death. The assumption that there is not a large support for theocracy is unwarranted, at best.
“I call it superficial because it just so happens to align perfectly with our own interests. ”
First of all, that’s a non sequitor. It is in my interest to think that the water from the tap is healthy. I still haven’t been sick yet. It’s in my interest to think my employer will pay me at the end of the month. Never failed yet.
Second, however, - who is this “our” in that sentence? And what interests? From my perspective, if Islamic jihad has a goal that is at least understandable to us, something like the Basque ETA or the IRA, then that’s something we can deal with. On the other hand, if its goals are like those stated by Hassan Nasrallah—“We want nothing from you, we want to eliminate you”—that’s another matter entirely. I would far, far, far rather deal with the first kind of an enemy, rather than the second.
To the subject of the bin Laden list of grievances, one of them is that the United States helped free East Timor from Indonesian rule, and end the genocide of the Christian nation there. To the Islamic fanatics, this is outrageous, because it is a matter of doctrine that no conquered infidel nation may ever be freed from Islamic rule.
Let’s take one example: 99% of Afghans think that the punishment for apostasy should be death.
That number struck me as surprisingly high, so I went looking for the source and I think it’s this. The 99% number is for “Muslims who favor making Islamic law the official law” in Afghanistan. The death-for-apostasy proportion is actually only 79% for pro-sharia Afghan Muslims (which is still 79% too high, but isn’t 99%).
Thanks—you’re quite right. That is the study I was thinking of, and 79% is still horrifyingly high—sorry for getting that wrong, and thanks for the correction!
Correct. In the field of politics, the stated reasons for an action are those judged most palatable and most persuasive to the audience. For example, very few countries will cite exploitation of natural resources as a reason for war. It’s always some humanitarian reason or a tortured reading of an ancient treaty that grants them the “right” to certain lands.
Once again, this assumes that his supporters and recruits think in a way that follows yours. I have to just say [citation needed]. Let’s take one example: 99% of Afghans think that the punishment for apostasy should be death. The assumption that there is not a large support for theocracy is unwarranted, at best.
It assumes that one should take notice that the hotbeds of terrorism happen to be places that were formerly subjects of imperialist policies or were treated as pawns during the Cold War. Do they hate America because of their religion, or did they turn to religion as an avenue for handling their grievances?
One line disproof: There have been a grand total of zero terrorist attacks on the United States from Vietnam, easily the most destructive and wicked war the US has ever waged—if people whose kids are still being born with birth defects don’t decide to fly planes into buildings, I think it is safe to say that something else is going on.
Again, this ignores the stated intentions and demands of Al Qaeda, to recreate the lost caliphate and enforce the most fanatical Islamic rule within it, a global Taliban style rule. It also ignores things like Al Qaeda’s stated support for the genocide in East Timor or Darfur.
You left out some possibilities. Perhaps religion both makes a counttry weak (and thus vulnerable to imperialism) and leads to terrorism? Or perhaps weakness makes a country vulnerable to imperialists, and also vulnerable to religious extremism?
And the other flaw in this reasoning is that there are a whole lot of places that were formerly imperialist subjects or were treated as pawns during the Cold War. They’re not all full of anti-Western terrorists now. Pretty much the only ones that are are the Islamic ones.
Hate groups have been an object of interest to law enforcement and psychologists for some years now. Most members are socially maladjusted and have trouble dealing with their insecurities. The “racial frenzy” arises from group dynamics. It provides group cohesion and gives the members a shared sense of purpose. It may motivate the group action, but it’s not what drew people to the group to begin with.
Here’s one model of hate groups.
I did read Orwell’s essay. He makes an excellent point about intellectuals failing to properly understand the powerful emotions that can motivate a group to unified action. I won’t contest the role of group identity and group dynamics. What I wish to examine are the motivations that lead people to associate with hate groups or terrorist networks in the first place.
Bin Laden himself may or may not have theocratic aims. My point was that without the political grievances, he just becomes some fanatic spouting rhetoric. With political grievances, he has supporters and recruits.
I call it superficial because it just so happens to align perfectly with our own interests. It demonizes the enemy and provides a casus belli. What it fails to do is answer the question of why radical Islam has become so popular in recent decades.
“Bin Laden himself may or may not have theocratic aims” - May or may not?
“My point was that without the political grievances, he just becomes some fanatic spouting rhetoric. With political grievances, he has supporters and recruits.” Once again, this assumes that his supporters and recruits think in a way that follows yours. I have to just say [citation needed]. Let’s take one example: 99% of Afghans think that the punishment for apostasy should be death. The assumption that there is not a large support for theocracy is unwarranted, at best.
“I call it superficial because it just so happens to align perfectly with our own interests. ”
First of all, that’s a non sequitor. It is in my interest to think that the water from the tap is healthy. I still haven’t been sick yet. It’s in my interest to think my employer will pay me at the end of the month. Never failed yet.
Second, however, - who is this “our” in that sentence? And what interests? From my perspective, if Islamic jihad has a goal that is at least understandable to us, something like the Basque ETA or the IRA, then that’s something we can deal with. On the other hand, if its goals are like those stated by Hassan Nasrallah—“We want nothing from you, we want to eliminate you”—that’s another matter entirely. I would far, far, far rather deal with the first kind of an enemy, rather than the second.
To the subject of the bin Laden list of grievances, one of them is that the United States helped free East Timor from Indonesian rule, and end the genocide of the Christian nation there. To the Islamic fanatics, this is outrageous, because it is a matter of doctrine that no conquered infidel nation may ever be freed from Islamic rule.
That number struck me as surprisingly high, so I went looking for the source and I think it’s this. The 99% number is for “Muslims who favor making Islamic law the official law” in Afghanistan. The death-for-apostasy proportion is actually only 79% for pro-sharia Afghan Muslims (which is still 79% too high, but isn’t 99%).
Thanks—you’re quite right. That is the study I was thinking of, and 79% is still horrifyingly high—sorry for getting that wrong, and thanks for the correction!
Correct. In the field of politics, the stated reasons for an action are those judged most palatable and most persuasive to the audience. For example, very few countries will cite exploitation of natural resources as a reason for war. It’s always some humanitarian reason or a tortured reading of an ancient treaty that grants them the “right” to certain lands.
It assumes that one should take notice that the hotbeds of terrorism happen to be places that were formerly subjects of imperialist policies or were treated as pawns during the Cold War. Do they hate America because of their religion, or did they turn to religion as an avenue for handling their grievances?
One line disproof: There have been a grand total of zero terrorist attacks on the United States from Vietnam, easily the most destructive and wicked war the US has ever waged—if people whose kids are still being born with birth defects don’t decide to fly planes into buildings, I think it is safe to say that something else is going on.
Again, this ignores the stated intentions and demands of Al Qaeda, to recreate the lost caliphate and enforce the most fanatical Islamic rule within it, a global Taliban style rule. It also ignores things like Al Qaeda’s stated support for the genocide in East Timor or Darfur.
You left out some possibilities. Perhaps religion both makes a counttry weak (and thus vulnerable to imperialism) and leads to terrorism? Or perhaps weakness makes a country vulnerable to imperialists, and also vulnerable to religious extremism?
And the other flaw in this reasoning is that there are a whole lot of places that were formerly imperialist subjects or were treated as pawns during the Cold War. They’re not all full of anti-Western terrorists now. Pretty much the only ones that are are the Islamic ones.