Richard, you have presented absolutely no evidence that there is a possible world physically identical to ours but in which we are not conscious, beyond saying that it’s “conceptually possible” for minds and brains to “come apart”, if we imagine a world with different laws of nature.
But it’s equally conceptually possible for flying machines and aerofoils to come apart, if we imagine a world with different laws of nature, and (it appears) you don’t see that as any reason to think that flying machines fly by aerofoils plus some extra bridging aviatiophysical laws.
Incidentally, I think you’re misunderstanding what Eliezer is trying to do. He’s saying (unless I’m misunderstanding him too) roughly “forget about justification; never mind what inference processes we can find the best arguments for; what matters is what actually works; if accepting the results of reasoning in your own brain works, then accepting the results of reasoning in an equally competent other brain works equally well”.
Richard, you have presented absolutely no evidence that there is a possible world physically identical to ours but in which we are not conscious, beyond saying that it’s “conceptually possible” for minds and brains to “come apart”, if we imagine a world with different laws of nature.
But it’s equally conceptually possible for flying machines and aerofoils to come apart, if we imagine a world with different laws of nature, and (it appears) you don’t see that as any reason to think that flying machines fly by aerofoils plus some extra bridging aviatiophysical laws.
Incidentally, I think you’re misunderstanding what Eliezer is trying to do. He’s saying (unless I’m misunderstanding him too) roughly “forget about justification; never mind what inference processes we can find the best arguments for; what matters is what actually works; if accepting the results of reasoning in your own brain works, then accepting the results of reasoning in an equally competent other brain works equally well”.