I can rigorously model a universe with different contents, and even one with different laws of physics, but I can’t think of how I could rigorously model (as opposed to vaguely imagine) one where 2+2=3. It just breaks everything. This suggests there’s still some difference in epistemic status between math and everything else. Are “necessary” and “contingent” no more than semantic stopsigns? How about “logical possibility” as distinct from physical possibility?
I can rigorously model a universe with different contents, and even one with different laws of physics, but I can’t think of how I could rigorously model (as opposed to vaguely imagine) one where 2+2=3. It just breaks everything. This suggests there’s still some difference in epistemic status between math and everything else. Are “necessary” and “contingent” no more than semantic stopsigns? How about “logical possibility” as distinct from physical possibility?