Do we have a working definition of free will? I thought of a possible one while reading this article, but wanted to know if there already is a defined complexity at which a neural network is considered to have free will.
There is a standard definition of libertarian free will, as follows:-
Free Will is defined as “the power or ability to rationally choose and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances”.
Not that according to this definition:
Free will is not deterministic behaviour. It is not driven by external circumstances.
Nor is free will is randomness or mere caprice. (“Rationally choose and consciously perform”).
Free will requires independence from external circumstances. It does not require independence or separation from one’s own self. Ones actions must be related to ones thoughts and motives
But not complete independence. Free will does not require that all our actions are free in this sense, only that some actions are not entirely un-free. (”...at least some of which...”).
Free will also does not require that any one action is entirely free. In particular, free will is not omnipotence: it does not require an ability to transcend natural laws, only the ability to select actions from what is physically possible.
Free will as defined above does not make any assumptions about the ontological nature of the self/mind/soul. There is a theory, according to which a supernatural soul pulls the strings of the body. That theory is all too often confused with free will. It might be taken as an explanation of free will, but it specifies a kind of mechanism or explanation — not a phenomenon to be explained.
Although this definition can be fulfilled in a physical universe, it can’t be fulfilled in any physical universe since it requires indeterminism. If determinism holds, a choice has to be made between adopting compatibilism (basically a legalistic definition) or abandoning free will entirely. The observation that is all physics/biology does not constrain things down very much.
The first question that comes to mind is “external to what?” What is the implied boundary?
For instance, a reasonable answer might be “external to our skulls”—but then this excludes, say, a brain tumor from “external circumstances”.
I would also take issue with the term “rationally”—if you interpret this liberally, say “a choice is rational if it makes a somewhat appropriate contribution to some of your projects or preferences” then I wouldn’t object, but if you mean “rational” in the sense of “not tainted by any known bias” you will end up excluding almost every decision made by almost every member of the human species from your definition of “free will”.
(I’m a compatibilist—I’ve been brought round to that point of view by Dennett’s writings—and I guess many LWers would identify with that point of view as well.)
Of course my decisions affect the future. It is precisely because the future is determined rather than undetermined that I’ve come to expect certain reliable effects from deciding things. (For instance, my deciding things reliably causes nerve impulses to be transmitted to my muscles, which transduce my decisions, otherwise mere neural firings, into macroscopic effects.)
If things happened one way or the other “at random” the capacity that we call “free will” couldn’t evolve in the first place. Rather, when I drop something midair it falls, always (or near as dammit), and I’m equipped with capacities which exploit this regularity.
But we don’t need strict determinism, since actions and results do not follow with complete reliability anyway; and we don’t need determinism at the decision-making stage in order to have it in the carrying-out stage. In two-stage theories of libertarian free will, a more-or-less indeterministic decision-making stage is followed by a more deterministic phase.
That’s an interesting model, that I hadn’t come across before (even in Dennett, or not with that much clarity); thanks.
OTOH, that doesn’t have much bearing on the question of “the ability of your decisions to affect the future”—since even in a deterministic universe my decisions do affect the future (in the sense above), I have no need to hope for indeterminism, in order to have a justified sense of my own free will.
In fact indeterminism seems to me, on the face of it, to undermine my free will insofar as it undermines the coupling between my decisions and their consequences. But I agree that in this two-stage model indeterminism could have upsides and now downsides, if we knew for sure that its effects were (somehow) confined to the alternative-generation phase.
The bad news, though, is that we’d need to come up with an explanation for why an otherwise deterministic universe should contain an indeterminate process at precisely that location.
since even in a deterministic universe my decisions do affect the future (in the sense above), I have no need to hope for indeterminism, in order to have a justified sense of my own free will.
In a deterministic universe, you cannot say that your decisions affect the future in the sense that the future would be different if they had been different..becuase they would not have been different. In a deterministic universe, decisions are part of the chain of cause and effect, but not a special part.
In fact indeterminism seems to me, on the face of it, to undermine my free will insofar as it undermines the coupling between my decisions and their consequences.
That is not the case in two stage theories.
But I agree that in this two-stage model indeterminism could have upsides and now downsides, if we knew for sure that its effects were (somehow) confined to the alternative-generation phase.
The bad news, though, is that we’d need to come up with an explanation for why an otherwise deterministic universe should contain an indeterminate process at precisely that location.
indeterminism may be readily available as noise in the nervous system, an indeterministic behaviour is useful in some game theoretic situations. How can a predator predict what you will do next, if you do not.
This definition sets out what FW is a capacity or faculty. not, as in compatibilist definitions, which actions are free. Libertarians still think some actions are unfree in the compatibilist/legal sense.
For instance, a reasonable answer might be “external to our skulls”—but then this excludes, say, a brain tumor from “external circumstances”.
Externality needs to take history into account. To act on a hypnotic suggestion is not to act freely, even though
the proximate cause of your actions is inside your skull, because it got into your head in a way that bypassed
rational judgement.
Note that this is certainly not the definition most LWers would recognize as “standard”. (I’ll comment separately on some questions raised by the above—OTOH, I’d prefer we avoid definitional disputes.)
Do we have a working definition of free will? I thought of a possible one while reading this article, but wanted to know if there already is a defined complexity at which a neural network is considered to have free will.
There is a standard definition of libertarian free will, as follows:-
Free Will is defined as “the power or ability to rationally choose and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances”.
Not that according to this definition:
Free will is not deterministic behaviour. It is not driven by external circumstances.
Nor is free will is randomness or mere caprice. (“Rationally choose and consciously perform”).
Free will requires independence from external circumstances. It does not require independence or separation from one’s own self. Ones actions must be related to ones thoughts and motives
But not complete independence. Free will does not require that all our actions are free in this sense, only that some actions are not entirely un-free. (”...at least some of which...”).
Free will also does not require that any one action is entirely free. In particular, free will is not omnipotence: it does not require an ability to transcend natural laws, only the ability to select actions from what is physically possible.
Free will as defined above does not make any assumptions about the ontological nature of the self/mind/soul. There is a theory, according to which a supernatural soul pulls the strings of the body. That theory is all too often confused with free will. It might be taken as an explanation of free will, but it specifies a kind of mechanism or explanation — not a phenomenon to be explained.
Although this definition can be fulfilled in a physical universe, it can’t be fulfilled in any physical universe since it requires indeterminism. If determinism holds, a choice has to be made between adopting compatibilism (basically a legalistic definition) or abandoning free will entirely. The observation that is all physics/biology does not constrain things down very much.
The first question that comes to mind is “external to what?” What is the implied boundary?
For instance, a reasonable answer might be “external to our skulls”—but then this excludes, say, a brain tumor from “external circumstances”.
I would also take issue with the term “rationally”—if you interpret this liberally, say “a choice is rational if it makes a somewhat appropriate contribution to some of your projects or preferences” then I wouldn’t object, but if you mean “rational” in the sense of “not tainted by any known bias” you will end up excluding almost every decision made by almost every member of the human species from your definition of “free will”.
(I’m a compatibilist—I’ve been brought round to that point of view by Dennett’s writings—and I guess many LWers would identify with that point of view as well.)
So the ability of your decisions to affect the future is not an aspect of will worth having?
Of course my decisions affect the future. It is precisely because the future is determined rather than undetermined that I’ve come to expect certain reliable effects from deciding things. (For instance, my deciding things reliably causes nerve impulses to be transmitted to my muscles, which transduce my decisions, otherwise mere neural firings, into macroscopic effects.)
If things happened one way or the other “at random” the capacity that we call “free will” couldn’t evolve in the first place. Rather, when I drop something midair it falls, always (or near as dammit), and I’m equipped with capacities which exploit this regularity.
But we don’t need strict determinism, since actions and results do not follow with complete reliability anyway; and we don’t need determinism at the decision-making stage in order to have it in the carrying-out stage. In two-stage theories of libertarian free will, a more-or-less indeterministic decision-making stage is followed by a more deterministic phase.
That’s an interesting model, that I hadn’t come across before (even in Dennett, or not with that much clarity); thanks.
OTOH, that doesn’t have much bearing on the question of “the ability of your decisions to affect the future”—since even in a deterministic universe my decisions do affect the future (in the sense above), I have no need to hope for indeterminism, in order to have a justified sense of my own free will.
In fact indeterminism seems to me, on the face of it, to undermine my free will insofar as it undermines the coupling between my decisions and their consequences. But I agree that in this two-stage model indeterminism could have upsides and now downsides, if we knew for sure that its effects were (somehow) confined to the alternative-generation phase.
The bad news, though, is that we’d need to come up with an explanation for why an otherwise deterministic universe should contain an indeterminate process at precisely that location.
In a deterministic universe, you cannot say that your decisions affect the future in the sense that the future would be different if they had been different..becuase they would not have been different. In a deterministic universe, decisions are part of the chain of cause and effect, but not a special part.
That is not the case in two stage theories.
indeterminism may be readily available as noise in the nervous system, an indeterministic behaviour is useful in some game theoretic situations. How can a predator predict what you will do next, if you do not.
This definition sets out what FW is a capacity or faculty. not, as in compatibilist definitions, which actions are free. Libertarians still think some actions are unfree in the compatibilist/legal sense.
Externality needs to take history into account. To act on a hypnotic suggestion is not to act freely, even though the proximate cause of your actions is inside your skull, because it got into your head in a way that bypassed rational judgement.
Note that this is certainly not the definition most LWers would recognize as “standard”. (I’ll comment separately on some questions raised by the above—OTOH, I’d prefer we avoid definitional disputes.)