Given your clarification of the question… I think my minimum standard for treating X as a continuation of my personal identity (whether X is an upload, or my organic body after a stroke, or various other things that some people treat as such a continuation and other people don’t) is that it experiences a significant fraction of the memories I experience, and that its other memories are consistent with those memories (that is, it’s plausible that a single entity in fact had all of those remembered experiences).
That’s not to say that the existence of X would satisfy me in a broader sense. Then again, my current existence isn’t always satisfactory either, but I still believe it’s my current existence.
Given your clarification of the question… I think my minimum standard for treating X as a continuation of my personal identity (whether X is an upload, or my organic body after a stroke, or various other things that some people treat as such a continuation and other people don’t) is that it experiences a significant fraction of the memories I experience, and that its other memories are consistent with those memories (that is, it’s plausible that a single entity in fact had all of those remembered experiences).
That’s not to say that the existence of X would satisfy me in a broader sense. Then again, my current existence isn’t always satisfactory either, but I still believe it’s my current existence.