On the first interpretation, Schopenhauer forbids us to build circular causal models of human psychology. The explanation for someone’s current will cannot be their current will—though it can include their past will.
Clearly accurate. The reason for me wanting ice cream may be obscure and complicated, but there must be something on a lower level than ‘I want ice cream’.
On the second interpretation, the sentence says that alternate choices are not reachable—that we couldn’t have taken other options even “if we had wanted to do so”.
Depends on your viewpoint. Inasmuch as the whole of the timeless universe is, what we think of as the past and the future are effectively determined. However, this interpretation seems to advocate a rejection of personal responsibility for one’s actions, which is wrong. If I want ice cream, I can either go to the shop, or not go to the shop. The fact that I will either go or not go doesn’t mean this choice was never there, only that a choice was made. Eliezer’s gone into detail about personal responsibility in a deterministic universe. This interpretation is a re-wording of the free will wrong question, and so is incorrect for our purposes.
On the third interpretation, the sentence says that we cannot control our own desires—that we are the prisoners of our own passions, even when we struggle against them.
This is comparable to the second interpretation, but on a more personal level. Our ‘desires’, such as they are, dictate our wills, and hence our actions. But the way this is worded suggests that we can only do what we want to do. The recent conversation between Subhan and Obert notwithstanding, I would say that morality overcomes this. I have experience of doing things I don’t want to do because I feel as though I should. Argue over the definitions of those terms if you will, that’s how it feels. So, thinking of ‘control’ as ‘successfully deal with and ignore where appropriate’, false.
On the fourth interpretation, the sentence says that we cannot control our own desires, because our desires themselves will determine which desires we want, and so protect themselves.
More like it, though not worded how I’d like it. Factors outside my control influence or even determine my desires, undoubtedly. (This is how I read Schopenhauer the first time round.) I can’t will myself to want ice cream. If I could, I’d have access to one of my own meta-levels, which would change the playing field entirely.
On the first interpretation, Schopenhauer forbids us to build circular causal models of human psychology. The explanation for someone’s current will cannot be their current will—though it can include their past will.
Clearly accurate. The reason for me wanting ice cream may be obscure and complicated, but there must be something on a lower level than ‘I want ice cream’.
On the second interpretation, the sentence says that alternate choices are not reachable—that we couldn’t have taken other options even “if we had wanted to do so”.
Depends on your viewpoint. Inasmuch as the whole of the timeless universe is, what we think of as the past and the future are effectively determined. However, this interpretation seems to advocate a rejection of personal responsibility for one’s actions, which is wrong. If I want ice cream, I can either go to the shop, or not go to the shop. The fact that I will either go or not go doesn’t mean this choice was never there, only that a choice was made. Eliezer’s gone into detail about personal responsibility in a deterministic universe. This interpretation is a re-wording of the free will wrong question, and so is incorrect for our purposes.
On the third interpretation, the sentence says that we cannot control our own desires—that we are the prisoners of our own passions, even when we struggle against them.
This is comparable to the second interpretation, but on a more personal level. Our ‘desires’, such as they are, dictate our wills, and hence our actions. But the way this is worded suggests that we can only do what we want to do. The recent conversation between Subhan and Obert notwithstanding, I would say that morality overcomes this. I have experience of doing things I don’t want to do because I feel as though I should. Argue over the definitions of those terms if you will, that’s how it feels. So, thinking of ‘control’ as ‘successfully deal with and ignore where appropriate’, false.
On the fourth interpretation, the sentence says that we cannot control our own desires, because our desires themselves will determine which desires we want, and so protect themselves.
More like it, though not worded how I’d like it. Factors outside my control influence or even determine my desires, undoubtedly. (This is how I read Schopenhauer the first time round.) I can’t will myself to want ice cream. If I could, I’d have access to one of my own meta-levels, which would change the playing field entirely.