I am not sure what exactly the first two mean. If the first one means that the current will or want is not caused by itself, that seems to me as true, but it is sort of truism which doesn’t include much information (nothing is caused by itself, as far as the word cause is used in ordinary language).
If the second means that the alternate choices of what we want are not reachable (in sense we do not make conscious decision process to choose our wants), it is true concerning the primary desires (like the desire to survive) and false concerning more complicated (or derived) desires (e.g. desire to get some particular job); but if one takes the distinction between primary and derived desires as defined by the fact whether we consciously decide about them, then the second interpretation is empty.
The third is probably false. I was too lazy to think about what Eliezer precisely means by “controlling our passions”, but if we interpret it in a way how it would be interpreted by a random person with no special interest in philosophy, then it is false.
The fourth is true as long as there is some sharp border between “we” and “our desires”, otherwise also rather empty.
Altogether the four interpretations, altough more specific than the original sentence, seem to me only slightly less ambiguous. As a result I know neither what Schopenhauer intended to say nor what Eliezer intended to say.
My interpretation (of Schopenhauer, not of EY’s interpretation thereof) is that the processes in our brains can be divided into formation of desires and practical decisions. The practical decisions are caused by the desires (we can do what we want), but it has no sense to say that the desires are caused by themselves—the only input of the creation of the set of all desires comes from the outside world (we cannot want what we want). It is probably closest to the first EY’s interpretation.
Concerning the four interpretations:
I am not sure what exactly the first two mean. If the first one means that the current will or want is not caused by itself, that seems to me as true, but it is sort of truism which doesn’t include much information (nothing is caused by itself, as far as the word cause is used in ordinary language).
If the second means that the alternate choices of what we want are not reachable (in sense we do not make conscious decision process to choose our wants), it is true concerning the primary desires (like the desire to survive) and false concerning more complicated (or derived) desires (e.g. desire to get some particular job); but if one takes the distinction between primary and derived desires as defined by the fact whether we consciously decide about them, then the second interpretation is empty.
The third is probably false. I was too lazy to think about what Eliezer precisely means by “controlling our passions”, but if we interpret it in a way how it would be interpreted by a random person with no special interest in philosophy, then it is false.
The fourth is true as long as there is some sharp border between “we” and “our desires”, otherwise also rather empty.
Altogether the four interpretations, altough more specific than the original sentence, seem to me only slightly less ambiguous. As a result I know neither what Schopenhauer intended to say nor what Eliezer intended to say.
My interpretation (of Schopenhauer, not of EY’s interpretation thereof) is that the processes in our brains can be divided into formation of desires and practical decisions. The practical decisions are caused by the desires (we can do what we want), but it has no sense to say that the desires are caused by themselves—the only input of the creation of the set of all desires comes from the outside world (we cannot want what we want). It is probably closest to the first EY’s interpretation.