I’m truly grateful for the opportunity to engage meaningfully on this topic. You’ve brought up some important points:
“I do not have time” — Completely understandable. ”Symbol grounding” — This is inherently tied to the central issue we’re discussing. ”Qualia as Gödel sentences” — An important distinction here: it’s not that qualia are Gödel sentences, but rather, the absence of qualia functions analogously to a Gödel sentence — paradoxically. Consider this line of reasoning.
This paradox highlights the self-referential inconsistency — invoking Gödel’s incompleteness theorems:
To highlight expressivity: A. Lisa is a P-Zombie. B. Lisa asserts that she is a P-Zombie. C. A true P-Zombie cannot assert or hold beliefs. D. Therefore, Lisa cannot assert that she is a P-Zombie.
Cases:
A. Lisa is a P-Zombie. B. Lisa asserts that she is a P-Zombie. C. Lisa would be complete: Not Possible
A. Lisa is not a P-Zombie. B. Lisa asserts that she is a P-Zombie. C. Lisa would be not complete: Possible but irrelevant.
A. Lisa is a P-Zombie. B. Lisa asserts that she is a not P-Zombie. C. Lisa would be not complete: Possible
A. Lisa is not a P-Zombie. B. Lisa asserts that she is a not P-Zombie. C. Lisa would be complete: Not Possible
In order for Lisa to be internally consistent yet incomplete, she must maintain that she is not a P-Zombie. But if she maintains that she is not a P-Zombie AND IS NOT A P-Zombie, Lisa would be complete. AHA! Thus impossible.
This connects to Turing’s use of Modus Tollens in the halting problem — a kind of logical self-reference that breaks the system from within.
Regarding Hofstadter: My use of Gödel’s ideas is strictly arithmetic and formal — not metaphorical or analogical, as Hofstadter often approaches them. So while interesting, his theory diverges significantly from what I’m proposing.
You mentioned:
“I can tell you how a ‘believer’...” — Exactly. That’s the point. “Believer”
“You mention Penrose.” — Yes. Penrose is consequential. Though I believe his argument is flawed. His reasoning hinges on accepting qualia as a given. If he somehow manages to validate that assumption by proving second order logic in the quantum realm, I’ll tip my hat — but my framework challenges that very basis.
You said:
“My approach is Husserlian realism about the mind — you don’t start with mindless matter and hope...” — Right, but I’d like to clarify: this critique applies more to Eliminative Materialism than to Eliminative Nominalism. In EN, ‘matter’ itself is a symbol — not a foundational substance. So the problem isn’t starting with “mindless matter” — it’s assuming that “matter” has ontological priority at all. And finally, on the notion of substance — I’m not relying on that strawman. My position isn’t based on classical substance dualism
I’m truly grateful for the opportunity to engage meaningfully on this topic. You’ve brought up some important points:
“I do not have time” — Completely understandable.
”Symbol grounding” — This is inherently tied to the central issue we’re discussing.
”Qualia as Gödel sentences” — An important distinction here: it’s not that qualia are Gödel sentences, but rather, the absence of qualia functions analogously to a Gödel sentence — paradoxically.
Consider this line of reasoning.
This paradox highlights the self-referential inconsistency — invoking Gödel’s incompleteness theorems:
To highlight expressivity:
A. Lisa is a P-Zombie.
B. Lisa asserts that she is a P-Zombie.
C. A true P-Zombie cannot assert or hold beliefs.
D. Therefore, Lisa cannot assert that she is a P-Zombie.
Cases:
A. Lisa is a P-Zombie.
B. Lisa asserts that she is a P-Zombie.
C. Lisa would be complete: Not Possible
A. Lisa is not a P-Zombie.
B. Lisa asserts that she is a P-Zombie.
C. Lisa would be not complete: Possible but irrelevant.
A. Lisa is a P-Zombie.
B. Lisa asserts that she is a not P-Zombie.
C. Lisa would be not complete: Possible
A. Lisa is not a P-Zombie.
B. Lisa asserts that she is a not P-Zombie.
C. Lisa would be complete: Not Possible
In order for Lisa to be internally consistent yet incomplete, she must maintain that she is not a P-Zombie. But if she maintains that she is not a P-Zombie AND IS NOT A P-Zombie, Lisa would be complete. AHA! Thus impossible.
This connects to Turing’s use of Modus Tollens in the halting problem — a kind of logical self-reference that breaks the system from within.
Regarding Hofstadter: My use of Gödel’s ideas is strictly arithmetic and formal — not metaphorical or analogical, as Hofstadter often approaches them. So while interesting, his theory diverges significantly from what I’m proposing.
You mentioned:
“I can tell you how a ‘believer’...”
— Exactly. That’s the point. “Believer”
“You mention Penrose.”
— Yes. Penrose is consequential. Though I believe his argument is flawed. His reasoning hinges on accepting qualia as a given. If he somehow manages to validate that assumption by proving second order logic in the quantum realm, I’ll tip my hat — but my framework challenges that very basis.
You said:
“My approach is Husserlian realism about the mind — you don’t start with mindless matter and hope...”
— Right, but I’d like to clarify: this critique applies more to Eliminative Materialism than to Eliminative Nominalism. In EN, ‘matter’ itself is a symbol — not a foundational substance. So the problem isn’t starting with “mindless matter” — it’s assuming that “matter” has ontological priority at all.
And finally, on the notion of substance — I’m not relying on that strawman. My position isn’t based on classical substance dualism