As to the second issue, I think you’ve probably already conceded this. My point is really just that there’s no reason the “proper” evaluative standard has to have anything to do with either of the conflicting ones. It could be something else entirely. For example, I think my comment here explains how one might parse the Broome passage in a way that allows a single coherent evaluation, despite the existence of the two conflicting perpectives you set out.
More generally, say we have a choice between two distributions of stuff: x = (2,8) and y = (8,3), where the first number is what I get, and the second number is what you get. From your perspective, x is best, while from my perspective y is best, so we have two conflicting evaluations. Nonetheless, most people would accept as coherent an evaluative perspective that prefers the option with the largest sum (which in this case favours y).
OK, cool. Just checking. ;)
As to the second issue, I think you’ve probably already conceded this. My point is really just that there’s no reason the “proper” evaluative standard has to have anything to do with either of the conflicting ones. It could be something else entirely. For example, I think my comment here explains how one might parse the Broome passage in a way that allows a single coherent evaluation, despite the existence of the two conflicting perpectives you set out.
More generally, say we have a choice between two distributions of stuff: x = (2,8) and y = (8,3), where the first number is what I get, and the second number is what you get. From your perspective, x is best, while from my perspective y is best, so we have two conflicting evaluations. Nonetheless, most people would accept as coherent an evaluative perspective that prefers the option with the largest sum (which in this case favours y).