Under these assumptions we can observe that the metric by which our decision is measured changes with relation to the decision we make!
I can’t quite tell, but it seems like you might be heading towards a “population-relative betterness” approach of the sort put forward by Dasgupta (1994). He ends up advocating a two-stage decision procedure. In stage one, you divide the options into sets that have the same population (which ensures that they are comparable, or “in the same metric” in your terms), and identify the best option in each set. In the second, you decide between the remaining options according to what is best for (or in the metric of) the current decision-making population.
Although it is not without problems, I am sympathetic to this approach. Broome seems to be too, but ends up arguing that it doesn’t quite work. Parts of the argument can be found in his 1996 article “The Welfare Economics of Population” but he expands on these ideas more (and presents an alternative view) in more detail in Weighing Lives.
I can’t possibly do Broome’s argument justice (not least because I may be remembering it incorrectly); but part of the argument is that is that there is in fact a more “universal” metric that allows us to compare the value of non-existence to existence-with-a-given-level-of-utility (thus denying your statement above). Very roughly, Broome argues that rather than it not being possible to compare existence to non-existence, such comparisons are vague.
What emerges from this is something like a critical-level utilitarianism, where people should be brought into existence if they will have utility above a certain level. (As has already been alluded to, total utilitarianism and average utilitarianism are special cases of this where the critical level is set to zero or the current average respectively. But as this makes clear, these reflect only a tiny part of the possible space of approaches.)
Refs:
Dasgupta, P. (1994) “Savings and Fertility: Ethical Issues” Philosophy and Public Affairs 23: 99-127.
Broome, J. (1996) “The Welfare Economics of Population” Oxford Economic Papers 48(2): 177-193
Broome J. (2004) Weighing Lives OUP.
ETA: Posted this before I saw your actual proposal. It’s now clear this wasn’t quite where you were headed. I’d still be interested to see what you think of it though.
This is exactly the sort of thing I’m interested to find, thanks very much for pointing it out! I’ll pick up a copy of weighing lives next week.
I posted my idea for a normative rule, and indeed it is similar, though it seems to work in reverse. I’m also seeing issues with what I imagine Dasgupta’s idea to be that my strategy doesn’t have, but I can’t say more till I get a chance to read the arguments and counterarguments.
Let me know if you find any major intuitions that you think it runs afoul of. If I remember correctly Broome’s take was essentially that it gives the right results, but that the rationale underlying it is suspect.
I can’t quite tell, but it seems like you might be heading towards a “population-relative betterness” approach of the sort put forward by Dasgupta (1994). He ends up advocating a two-stage decision procedure. In stage one, you divide the options into sets that have the same population (which ensures that they are comparable, or “in the same metric” in your terms), and identify the best option in each set. In the second, you decide between the remaining options according to what is best for (or in the metric of) the current decision-making population.
Although it is not without problems, I am sympathetic to this approach. Broome seems to be too, but ends up arguing that it doesn’t quite work. Parts of the argument can be found in his 1996 article “The Welfare Economics of Population” but he expands on these ideas more (and presents an alternative view) in more detail in Weighing Lives.
I can’t possibly do Broome’s argument justice (not least because I may be remembering it incorrectly); but part of the argument is that is that there is in fact a more “universal” metric that allows us to compare the value of non-existence to existence-with-a-given-level-of-utility (thus denying your statement above). Very roughly, Broome argues that rather than it not being possible to compare existence to non-existence, such comparisons are vague.
What emerges from this is something like a critical-level utilitarianism, where people should be brought into existence if they will have utility above a certain level. (As has already been alluded to, total utilitarianism and average utilitarianism are special cases of this where the critical level is set to zero or the current average respectively. But as this makes clear, these reflect only a tiny part of the possible space of approaches.)
Refs:
Dasgupta, P. (1994) “Savings and Fertility: Ethical Issues” Philosophy and Public Affairs 23: 99-127.
Broome, J. (1996) “The Welfare Economics of Population” Oxford Economic Papers 48(2): 177-193
Broome J. (2004) Weighing Lives OUP.
ETA: Posted this before I saw your actual proposal. It’s now clear this wasn’t quite where you were headed. I’d still be interested to see what you think of it though.
This is exactly the sort of thing I’m interested to find, thanks very much for pointing it out! I’ll pick up a copy of weighing lives next week.
I posted my idea for a normative rule, and indeed it is similar, though it seems to work in reverse. I’m also seeing issues with what I imagine Dasgupta’s idea to be that my strategy doesn’t have, but I can’t say more till I get a chance to read the arguments and counterarguments.
Let me know if you find any major intuitions that you think it runs afoul of. If I remember correctly Broome’s take was essentially that it gives the right results, but that the rationale underlying it is suspect.