In total utilitarianism, it is a morally neutral act to kill someone (in a painless and unexpected manner) and creating/giving birth to another being of comparable happiness (or preference satisfaction or welfare).
In hedonic utilitarianism, yes.
Even in hedonistic utilitarianism, it is an almost misleading simplification. There are crucial differences between killing a person and not birthing a new one: Most importantly, one is seen as breaking the social covenant of non-violence, while the other is not. One disrupts pre-existing social networks, the other does not. One destroys an experienced educated brain, the other does not. Endorsing one causes social distrust and strife in ways the other does not.
A better claim might be: It is morally neutral in hedonistic utilitarianism to create a perfect copy of a person and painlessly and unexpectedly destroy the original. It’s a more accurate claim, and I personally would accept it.
Even in hedonistic utilitarianism, it is an almost misleading simplification. There are crucial differences between killing a person and not birthing a new one: Most importantly, one is seen as breaking the social covenant of non-violence, while the other is not. One disrupts pre-existing social networks, the other does not. One destroys an experienced educated brain, the other does not. Endorsing one causes social distrust and strife in ways the other does not.
These are all practical considerations. Most people believe it is wrong in principle to kill someone and replace them with a being of comparable happiness. You don’t see people going around saying:
“Look at that moderately happy person. It sure is too bad that it’s impractical to kill them and replace them with a slightly happier person. The world would be a lot better if that were possible.”
I also doubt that an aversion to violence is what prevents people from endorsing replacement either. You don’t see people going around saying:
“Man, I sure wish that person would get killed in a tornado or a car accident. Then I could replace them without breaking any social covenants.”
I believe that people reject replacement because they see it as a bad consequence, not because of any practical or deontological considerations. I wholeheartedly endorse such a rejection.
A better claim might be: It is morally neutral in hedonistic utilitarianism to create a perfect copy of a person and painlessly and unexpectedly destroy the original. It’s a more accurate claim, and I personally would accept it.
The reason that that claim seems acceptable is because, under many understandings of how personal identity works, if a copy of someone exists, they aren’t really dead. You killed a piece of them, but there’s still another piece left alive. As long as your memories, personality, and values continue to exist you still live.
The OP makes it clear that what they mean is that total utilitarianism (hedonic and otherwise) maintains that it is morally neutral to kill someone and replace them with a completely different person who has totally different memories, personality, and values, providing the second person is of comparable happiness to the first. I believe any moral theory that produces this result ought to be rejected.
Even in hedonistic utilitarianism, it is an almost misleading simplification. There are crucial differences between killing a person and not birthing a new one: Most importantly, one is seen as breaking the social covenant of non-violence, while the other is not. One disrupts pre-existing social networks, the other does not. One destroys an experienced educated brain, the other does not. Endorsing one causes social distrust and strife in ways the other does not.
A better claim might be: It is morally neutral in hedonistic utilitarianism to create a perfect copy of a person and painlessly and unexpectedly destroy the original. It’s a more accurate claim, and I personally would accept it.
These are all practical considerations. Most people believe it is wrong in principle to kill someone and replace them with a being of comparable happiness. You don’t see people going around saying:
“Look at that moderately happy person. It sure is too bad that it’s impractical to kill them and replace them with a slightly happier person. The world would be a lot better if that were possible.”
I also doubt that an aversion to violence is what prevents people from endorsing replacement either. You don’t see people going around saying:
“Man, I sure wish that person would get killed in a tornado or a car accident. Then I could replace them without breaking any social covenants.”
I believe that people reject replacement because they see it as a bad consequence, not because of any practical or deontological considerations. I wholeheartedly endorse such a rejection.
The reason that that claim seems acceptable is because, under many understandings of how personal identity works, if a copy of someone exists, they aren’t really dead. You killed a piece of them, but there’s still another piece left alive. As long as your memories, personality, and values continue to exist you still live.
The OP makes it clear that what they mean is that total utilitarianism (hedonic and otherwise) maintains that it is morally neutral to kill someone and replace them with a completely different person who has totally different memories, personality, and values, providing the second person is of comparable happiness to the first. I believe any moral theory that produces this result ought to be rejected.