I think you might want to not call your ethical theory utilitarianism. Aquinas’ ethics also emphasize the importance of the common welfare and loving thy neighbor as thyself, yet AFAIK no one calls his ethics utilitarian.
I think maybe the purest statement of utilitarianism is that it pursues “the greatest good for the greatest number”. The word “for” is important here. Something that improves your quality of life is good for you. Clippy might think (issues of rigid designators in metaethics aside) that paperclips are good without having a concept of whether they’re good for anyone, so he’s a consequentialist but not a utilitarian. An egoist has a concept of things being good for people, but chooses only those things that are good for himself, not for the greatest number; so an egoist is also a consequentialist but not a utilitarian. But there’s a pretty wide range of possible concepts of what’s good for an individual, and I think that entire range should be compatible with the term “utilitarian”.
It doesn’t make sense to me to count maximization of total X as “utilitarianism” if X is pleasure or if X is preference satisfaction but not if X is some other measure of quality of life. It doesn’t seem like that would cut reality at the joints. I don’t necessarily hold the position I described, but I think most criticisms of it are misguided, and it’s natural enough to deserve a short name.
I think you might want to not call your ethical theory utilitarianism. Aquinas’ ethics also emphasize the importance of the common welfare and loving thy neighbor as thyself, yet AFAIK no one calls his ethics utilitarian.
I think maybe the purest statement of utilitarianism is that it pursues “the greatest good for the greatest number”. The word “for” is important here. Something that improves your quality of life is good for you. Clippy might think (issues of rigid designators in metaethics aside) that paperclips are good without having a concept of whether they’re good for anyone, so he’s a consequentialist but not a utilitarian. An egoist has a concept of things being good for people, but chooses only those things that are good for himself, not for the greatest number; so an egoist is also a consequentialist but not a utilitarian. But there’s a pretty wide range of possible concepts of what’s good for an individual, and I think that entire range should be compatible with the term “utilitarian”.
It doesn’t make sense to me to count maximization of total X as “utilitarianism” if X is pleasure or if X is preference satisfaction but not if X is some other measure of quality of life. It doesn’t seem like that would cut reality at the joints. I don’t necessarily hold the position I described, but I think most criticisms of it are misguided, and it’s natural enough to deserve a short name.