I think people find the repugnant conclusion repugnant because they are using two different definitions for a “life barely worth living”.
Society has very strong social norms against telling people to commit suicide. When someone’s life is really miserable, almost no one tells them that killing themselves is the best thing they can do. Even euthanasia for people who are permanently and unavoidably suffering is controversial. So from a utilitarian perspective, you could say that people tend to have a strong “pro-life” bias, even when more life means more suffering.
But let’s consider which lives actually have marginal benefit. Is it really actually a morally positive thing to bring in to the world someone who’s life is going to be miserable?
Consider someone who is going to have an unpleasant childhood, an unpleasant adulthood, work too many hours at a job they don’t enjoy as an adult, have their spouse die early, and finally die a lonely and isolated death themselves. Would you really bring someone like that in to the world given the choice? (Assuming no positive externalities from them working at their job.)
But let’s say you meet this person in college and you can tell how the rest of their life is going to go. Would you encourage them to commit suicide, thereby reaping a moral surplus? Probably not, because now you’re operating under the original definition of “life worth living” since the question is whether to kill instead of whether to bring in to existence.
Where is the “utilitarian zero point” actually at? In my view, the zero point represents someone whose life has ups and downs, and all the ups exactly cancel out all the downs. So now say we had a world where everyone’s life has ups and downs, and for every person, there are ever-so-slightly more ups than downs—and there are tons and tons of people. That sounds pretty desirable, doesn’t it?
Another dimension to the ups and downs, as I mentioned elsewhere:
I think the “Repugnancy” comes from picturing a very low but positive quality of life as some kind of dull gray monotone, instead of the usual ups and downs, and then feeling enormous boredom, and then projecting that boredom onto the scenario.
I think the “Repugnancy” comes from picturing a very low but positive quality of life as some kind of dull gray monotone, instead of the usual ups and downs, and then feeling enormous boredom, and then projecting that boredom onto the scenario.
I think a world where I felt a huge amount of awful downs over the course of my life is also pretty darn repugnant. Yes, I’d feel some ups as well, but it seems like a world where a smaller population felt almost no downs is probably better than a larger population with lots of downs.
But let’s say you meet this person in college and you can tell how the rest of their life is going to go. Would you encourage them to commit suicide, thereby reaping a moral surplus?
One problem I see is that there is no way to tell. You may have an idea, but there is no way to know with 100% certainty that they won’t turn things around and lead a net happy life down the line.
I’m not sure why I am getting voted down for the above comment. Is it because I am being perceived as “attacking the hypothetical”? In this case, maybe I just interpreted John_Maxwell_IV’s comment differently. By “you can tell” does that mean that we have perfect knowledge of the entirety of the future of that person’s life? Even if this were true, we are also an agent that can influence that future. I would prefer to act to alter the future (i.e. make that person happier) than to act to motivate them to commit suicide. Maybe I’m just weird in that I’d rather make people happy than make them dead.
I didn’t downvote, but to me it feels like attacking the hypothetical; that would be my guess.
Obviously in real life most people (certainly, I think, most LWers) are VERY VERY HIGH above the “zero line” or whatever, so these sorts of questions feel pretty abstract to me.
Obviously in real life most people (certainly, I think, most LWers) are VERY VERY HIGH above the “zero line” or whatever, so these sorts of questions feel pretty abstract to me.
I don’t think that’s obvious. Something like 1⁄5 of LW is depressed.
I suspect commuting is below the zero line, i.e. people would fast-forward through their commutes even if it meant never getting those hours back.
I think people find the repugnant conclusion repugnant because they are using two different definitions for a “life barely worth living”.
Society has very strong social norms against telling people to commit suicide. When someone’s life is really miserable, almost no one tells them that killing themselves is the best thing they can do. Even euthanasia for people who are permanently and unavoidably suffering is controversial. So from a utilitarian perspective, you could say that people tend to have a strong “pro-life” bias, even when more life means more suffering.
But let’s consider which lives actually have marginal benefit. Is it really actually a morally positive thing to bring in to the world someone who’s life is going to be miserable?
Consider someone who is going to have an unpleasant childhood, an unpleasant adulthood, work too many hours at a job they don’t enjoy as an adult, have their spouse die early, and finally die a lonely and isolated death themselves. Would you really bring someone like that in to the world given the choice? (Assuming no positive externalities from them working at their job.)
But let’s say you meet this person in college and you can tell how the rest of their life is going to go. Would you encourage them to commit suicide, thereby reaping a moral surplus? Probably not, because now you’re operating under the original definition of “life worth living” since the question is whether to kill instead of whether to bring in to existence.
Where is the “utilitarian zero point” actually at? In my view, the zero point represents someone whose life has ups and downs, and all the ups exactly cancel out all the downs. So now say we had a world where everyone’s life has ups and downs, and for every person, there are ever-so-slightly more ups than downs—and there are tons and tons of people. That sounds pretty desirable, doesn’t it?
Another dimension to the ups and downs, as I mentioned elsewhere:
I think a world where I felt a huge amount of awful downs over the course of my life is also pretty darn repugnant. Yes, I’d feel some ups as well, but it seems like a world where a smaller population felt almost no downs is probably better than a larger population with lots of downs.
One problem I see is that there is no way to tell. You may have an idea, but there is no way to know with 100% certainty that they won’t turn things around and lead a net happy life down the line.
I’m not sure why I am getting voted down for the above comment. Is it because I am being perceived as “attacking the hypothetical”? In this case, maybe I just interpreted John_Maxwell_IV’s comment differently. By “you can tell” does that mean that we have perfect knowledge of the entirety of the future of that person’s life? Even if this were true, we are also an agent that can influence that future. I would prefer to act to alter the future (i.e. make that person happier) than to act to motivate them to commit suicide. Maybe I’m just weird in that I’d rather make people happy than make them dead.
I didn’t downvote, but to me it feels like attacking the hypothetical; that would be my guess.
Obviously in real life most people (certainly, I think, most LWers) are VERY VERY HIGH above the “zero line” or whatever, so these sorts of questions feel pretty abstract to me.
I don’t think that’s obvious. Something like 1⁄5 of LW is depressed.
I suspect commuting is below the zero line, i.e. people would fast-forward through their commutes even if it meant never getting those hours back.