So to summarise, we have A, where there’s a large affluent population. Then we move to A+, where there’s a large affluent population and separately, a small poor population (whose lives are still just barely worth living). We intuit that A+ is better than A. Then we move to B, where we combine A+’s large affluent population with the small poor population and get a very large, middle-upper-class population. We intuit that B is better than A+, and transitively, better than A. This reasoning suggests that hypothetical C would be better than B or A, and so on until Z, which is our universe tiled with just-barely-worth-living people, and that seems repugnant.
Ghatanathoah’s claim is that moving from A to A+ adds some number of people, and some amount of resources that gives them worthwhile lives. Moving from A+ to B then fairly re-distributes resources. This is therefore shown to be a good act. But moving from B directly to C adds just people, and fairly re-distributes resources. This has not been shown to be a good act! So the repugnant conclusion fails because it gets you to agree to a particular act, and then uses sleight of hand to swap that particular act out for a different, worse act while still holding you to your original agreement!
We can make the same dance of moves from B to B+ (more people, worthwhile lives) and then B+ to C (redistribution and aggregate value increase). So, unless you are willing to deny transitivity, then moving from B to C is what we should do. Rinse and repeat until Z.
(This is assuming you mean resources as well being. However, the OPs resources point isn’t responsive to Parfit’s argument).
The thing is, you never actually get to Z. if you do add people and enough resources for their bare minimum, you approach Z from above but never actually reach it—the standard of living never drops below the bare minimum.
It is perhaps cheating to say that Z is when average utility drops below the bare minimum. If the Repugnant Conclusion is that we prefer A to Z, even though all the lives in both are worth living, then that is another matter.
Lives in Z are stipulated to be above the neutral level so they are better lived than not. The repugnancy is that they are barely worth living, so just above this level, and most people find that a very large population of lives barely worth living is not preferable to a smaller one with very good lives.
most people find that a very large population of lives barely worth living is not preferable to a smaller one with very good lives.
Sure, so adding poor people to a rich world and averaging out the resources is bad, not good, and we shouldn’t do it. It seems to me that the argument that the argument for adding people doesn’t take into account this preference for a few rich over many poor.
Also, there may be anthropic reasons for that preference: would you rather be born as one of 500 rich, or one of 10,000 poor? Now, would you rather a 5% chance of existing as a rich person (95% not-exist) or a 100% chance of existing as a poor person?
Sure, so adding poor people to a rich world and averaging out the resources is bad, not good, and we shouldn’t do it.
Which step(s) do you disagree with? Adding poor people or averaging the utility?
Parfit defends the first step by saying that it’s a “mere addition”. Poor people on they’re own are (somewhat) good. Rich people on their own are good. Therefore the combination of the two is better than either.
The second step (averaging the resources) is supposed to be intuitively obvious. We can tweak the mathematics so that the quality of life of the rich only goes down a tiny amount to bring the poor up to their level. If the rich could end all poverty by giving a very small amount wouldn’t that be the right thing to do?
So to summarise, we have A, where there’s a large affluent population.
Then we move to A+, where there’s a large affluent population and separately, a small poor population (whose lives are still just barely worth living). We intuit that A+ is better than A.
Then we move to B, where we combine A+’s large affluent population with the small poor population and get a very large, middle-upper-class population. We intuit that B is better than A+, and transitively, better than A.
This reasoning suggests that hypothetical C would be better than B or A, and so on until Z, which is our universe tiled with just-barely-worth-living people, and that seems repugnant.
Ghatanathoah’s claim is that moving from A to A+ adds some number of people, and some amount of resources that gives them worthwhile lives. Moving from A+ to B then fairly re-distributes resources. This is therefore shown to be a good act. But moving from B directly to C adds just people, and fairly re-distributes resources. This has not been shown to be a good act! So the repugnant conclusion fails because it gets you to agree to a particular act, and then uses sleight of hand to swap that particular act out for a different, worse act while still holding you to your original agreement!
We can make the same dance of moves from B to B+ (more people, worthwhile lives) and then B+ to C (redistribution and aggregate value increase). So, unless you are willing to deny transitivity, then moving from B to C is what we should do. Rinse and repeat until Z.
(This is assuming you mean resources as well being. However, the OPs resources point isn’t responsive to Parfit’s argument).
The thing is, you never actually get to Z. if you do add people and enough resources for their bare minimum, you approach Z from above but never actually reach it—the standard of living never drops below the bare minimum.
It is perhaps cheating to say that Z is when average utility drops below the bare minimum. If the Repugnant Conclusion is that we prefer A to Z, even though all the lives in both are worth living, then that is another matter.
Lives in Z are stipulated to be above the neutral level so they are better lived than not. The repugnancy is that they are barely worth living, so just above this level, and most people find that a very large population of lives barely worth living is not preferable to a smaller one with very good lives.
Sure, so adding poor people to a rich world and averaging out the resources is bad, not good, and we shouldn’t do it. It seems to me that the argument that the argument for adding people doesn’t take into account this preference for a few rich over many poor.
Also, there may be anthropic reasons for that preference: would you rather be born as one of 500 rich, or one of 10,000 poor? Now, would you rather a 5% chance of existing as a rich person (95% not-exist) or a 100% chance of existing as a poor person?
Which step(s) do you disagree with? Adding poor people or averaging the utility?
Parfit defends the first step by saying that it’s a “mere addition”. Poor people on they’re own are (somewhat) good. Rich people on their own are good. Therefore the combination of the two is better than either.
The second step (averaging the resources) is supposed to be intuitively obvious. We can tweak the mathematics so that the quality of life of the rich only goes down a tiny amount to bring the poor up to their level. If the rich could end all poverty by giving a very small amount wouldn’t that be the right thing to do?