I think you’re right that redistribution can make sense. Pretty weird that people will still argue against any notion of government-facilitated redistribution: We can explicitly write out hypothetical utility functions and starting bundles and show that redistribution can be preferred by everyone. Even if a person thinks that no one should be coerced, they shouldn’t be against a mechanism that redistributes if and only if everyone benefits, even if they think that status quo is currently sufficient for Pareto optimality (since this fact might not hold in the future, as your example shows).
I think this argument supports levels of redistribution like 50% (or 30% or 70% or whatever)...
It favours redistribution, but it doesn’t give you the mechanism by which it should occur. I’m not sure what the numbers you’re referring to are representing (i.e. 50%, 30%, 70%). Let’s say it’s the top-level tax rate. Then, ideally, you should decide which exact number and show that it’s better than any of the alternatives. I don’t think this is possible. It’s better to pick a mechanism that picks your numbers for you:
For example, rather than select a price for rice out of thin air, you could let a Pareto-efficient market determine that number (if you consider the goal of Pareto efficiency to be aligned). Note that markets have different prices for the exact same good at the same time (due to things like transportation costs), so having a goal for a universal rice price is the wrong approach from the outset. If a single number is the right approach, arbitrary numeric goals are not aligned when the goal’s specified range does not contain the ideal value. And even if you pick the right number upon the system’s implementation, the ideal value might move out of the range at a later time.
There are other redistributive mechanisms. You mention quadratic funding. Another example, if I donate a dollar, everyone else in my tax bracket has to pay the same proportion of income divided by 1000. I think these are both weak proposals because they don’t satisfy persuasive goals, but I’m just saying that there’s lots of different ways to redistribute. Once we think that there should be a redistributive mechanism, the problem is figuring out which possible mechanism has the strongest supporting argument.
So what goals should the mechanism satisfy? Pareto optimality probably. Non-coercion possibly (though you say “if the most selfish people lose out a little bit, [it’s not so bad]”, and I lean that way too). Note that Pareto optimality can be achieved even if not all steps are Pareto improvements, i.e. you can have a coercive Pareto-optimal solution. (It might also be that Pareto optimality and non-coercion are incompatible with each other.) These goals probably aren’t sufficient to uniquely specify our desired system, so I think there should be other goals, otherwise your choice between the several systems that satisfy the goalset is an arbitrary one (i.e. not well justified). But I’m not sure what those other goals should be.
Consequentialism is a really bad model for most people’s altruistic behavior
Sure, but consequentialism is a class of moral theories, not an empirical model of human behaviour. A lot of people try to come up with moral theories that justify their immoral choices (such as saving a family member instead of 100 strangers). It’s not hypocritical to say “Total Consequentialism is the correct moral theory” and then not behave like a perfect consequentialist, unless you also claim to be a perfect consequentialist or you criticise others for not being perfect consequentialists.
I think you’re right that redistribution can make sense. Pretty weird that people will still argue against any notion of government-facilitated redistribution: We can explicitly write out hypothetical utility functions and starting bundles and show that redistribution can be preferred by everyone. Even if a person thinks that no one should be coerced, they shouldn’t be against a mechanism that redistributes if and only if everyone benefits, even if they think that status quo is currently sufficient for Pareto optimality (since this fact might not hold in the future, as your example shows).
It favours redistribution, but it doesn’t give you the mechanism by which it should occur. I’m not sure what the numbers you’re referring to are representing (i.e. 50%, 30%, 70%). Let’s say it’s the top-level tax rate. Then, ideally, you should decide which exact number and show that it’s better than any of the alternatives. I don’t think this is possible. It’s better to pick a mechanism that picks your numbers for you:
There are other redistributive mechanisms. You mention quadratic funding. Another example, if I donate a dollar, everyone else in my tax bracket has to pay the same proportion of income divided by 1000. I think these are both weak proposals because they don’t satisfy persuasive goals, but I’m just saying that there’s lots of different ways to redistribute. Once we think that there should be a redistributive mechanism, the problem is figuring out which possible mechanism has the strongest supporting argument.
So what goals should the mechanism satisfy? Pareto optimality probably. Non-coercion possibly (though you say “if the most selfish people lose out a little bit, [it’s not so bad]”, and I lean that way too). Note that Pareto optimality can be achieved even if not all steps are Pareto improvements, i.e. you can have a coercive Pareto-optimal solution. (It might also be that Pareto optimality and non-coercion are incompatible with each other.) These goals probably aren’t sufficient to uniquely specify our desired system, so I think there should be other goals, otherwise your choice between the several systems that satisfy the goalset is an arbitrary one (i.e. not well justified). But I’m not sure what those other goals should be.
Sure, but consequentialism is a class of moral theories, not an empirical model of human behaviour. A lot of people try to come up with moral theories that justify their immoral choices (such as saving a family member instead of 100 strangers). It’s not hypocritical to say “Total Consequentialism is the correct moral theory” and then not behave like a perfect consequentialist, unless you also claim to be a perfect consequentialist or you criticise others for not being perfect consequentialists.