The Just World Hypothesis holds that people get what they deserve.
Because bad things aren’t purely random. The person on the motorcycle with the helmet, versus the person on the motorcycle without, are not courting tragedy equally; one of them is doing a little bit to “earn” their tragedy.
Likewise, Tit-for-Tat means evil people tend to be the recipients of evil in turn.
I think the “Just World Hypothesis”, as typically described, is largely incorrect in its use of the concept of deserving, versus the concept of having some responsibility for—but I also think most people who follow a variant of the JWH use the non-moralizing “responsibility” version, and it is largely (but not exclusively) those who oppose the Just World Hypothesis who insert moralizing, to make it seem more reprehensible. Regardless of whether they wear a helmet or not, motorcyclists don’t deserve to get hit; rather, whether or not they wear a helmet determines part of their responsibility for what happens when they do.
Those who believe in the Just World Hypothesis tend to analyze their behavior after something bad happens to them, and hold something they’ve done partially responsible, and try to correct their behavior in the future—and do the same thing to other people who have something bad happen to them. Those who oppose the hypothesis sometimes refer to this tendency as “victim blaming”.
Personally, I call it “willingness to accept and learn from mistakes”. But then, I tend to upset the sorts of people who use phrases like “victim blaming”.
ETA: Retracted, because I failed to actually answer the question, and Salemicus did.
The Just World Hypothesis can be summarised as “you reap what you sow.” If you wish to argue that you don’t “deserve” to reap what you sow (perhaps because you didn’t have access to better seeds), or that it’s not “just” to reap what you sow (because everyone should reap in rough equality, regardless of how they sowed), or similar, that’s fine, but you aren’t arguing against the Just World Hypothesis.
So when we see the fruit, the Just World Hypothesis tells us: that’s probably how the person sowed the seeds. And yes, there is noise, which is why it’s a heuristic, not an infallible rule. But the whole reason to sow the seeds in the first place was to cause them to bear fruit. “Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?” In other words, Coherent Extrapolated Volition.
So to take an example from the original post—smoking. If I meet someone with lung cancer, the overwhelming likelihood is that they are responsible for their own problem, through smoking. But if I smoke and then I get lung cancer, I’ll want to make excuses for myself, and will stubbornly refuse to make the connection between my own culpable past behaviour (the sowing) and my present misfortune (the reaping). People who complain about the Just World Hypothesis want me to extend this non-judgemental behaviour to everyone else. But just as with the Fundamental Attribution Error, the problem is not that I am being too harsh on other people, but that I am being too easy on myself. I am right to draw the connection between behaviour and outcomes for everyone else, and I should do the same for myself.
This is mostly true. One example of unjust happenings is the following: Bob was being good, i.e., acting in a way that benefits the community, and he was punished for it even though the community benefited.
Excellent post.
Related: It only takes a small extension of the logic to show that the Just World Hypothesis is a useful heuristic.
I don’t see it, how is it useful?
The Just World Hypothesis holds that people get what they deserve.
Because bad things aren’t purely random. The person on the motorcycle with the helmet, versus the person on the motorcycle without, are not courting tragedy equally; one of them is doing a little bit to “earn” their tragedy.
Likewise, Tit-for-Tat means evil people tend to be the recipients of evil in turn.
I think the “Just World Hypothesis”, as typically described, is largely incorrect in its use of the concept of deserving, versus the concept of having some responsibility for—but I also think most people who follow a variant of the JWH use the non-moralizing “responsibility” version, and it is largely (but not exclusively) those who oppose the Just World Hypothesis who insert moralizing, to make it seem more reprehensible. Regardless of whether they wear a helmet or not, motorcyclists don’t deserve to get hit; rather, whether or not they wear a helmet determines part of their responsibility for what happens when they do.
Those who believe in the Just World Hypothesis tend to analyze their behavior after something bad happens to them, and hold something they’ve done partially responsible, and try to correct their behavior in the future—and do the same thing to other people who have something bad happen to them. Those who oppose the hypothesis sometimes refer to this tendency as “victim blaming”.
Personally, I call it “willingness to accept and learn from mistakes”. But then, I tend to upset the sorts of people who use phrases like “victim blaming”.
ETA: Retracted, because I failed to actually answer the question, and Salemicus did.
To expand on what OrphanWilde wrote:
The Just World Hypothesis can be summarised as “you reap what you sow.” If you wish to argue that you don’t “deserve” to reap what you sow (perhaps because you didn’t have access to better seeds), or that it’s not “just” to reap what you sow (because everyone should reap in rough equality, regardless of how they sowed), or similar, that’s fine, but you aren’t arguing against the Just World Hypothesis.
So when we see the fruit, the Just World Hypothesis tells us: that’s probably how the person sowed the seeds. And yes, there is noise, which is why it’s a heuristic, not an infallible rule. But the whole reason to sow the seeds in the first place was to cause them to bear fruit. “Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?” In other words, Coherent Extrapolated Volition.
So to take an example from the original post—smoking. If I meet someone with lung cancer, the overwhelming likelihood is that they are responsible for their own problem, through smoking. But if I smoke and then I get lung cancer, I’ll want to make excuses for myself, and will stubbornly refuse to make the connection between my own culpable past behaviour (the sowing) and my present misfortune (the reaping). People who complain about the Just World Hypothesis want me to extend this non-judgemental behaviour to everyone else. But just as with the Fundamental Attribution Error, the problem is not that I am being too harsh on other people, but that I am being too easy on myself. I am right to draw the connection between behaviour and outcomes for everyone else, and I should do the same for myself.
This is mostly true. One example of unjust happenings is the following: Bob was being good, i.e., acting in a way that benefits the community, and he was punished for it even though the community benefited.