Prompted by this comment, looking for references on the reductionism and the laws of nature, specifically, to address this argument:
if physical laws are guiding “reality” than they are not reducible to quarks and leptons themselves, which does call the whole idea of reductionism in question.
Basically, where do the laws of “fundamental” physics fit in the map/territory model (trying to steel-man it for myself, given that I’m not a fan)? If they are in the territory, what does the ultimate reduction look like? Is Nature just a fancy mathematical formula and some initial conditions, Tegmark-style? And if the physical laws are in the map, what represents them in the territory?
I don’t have any references, but I’ll share my view:
The way the particles are actually behaving is part of the territory, the mathematical symbols we use to describe such behavior are part of the map.
And I don’t see how this calls the whole idea of reductionism into question. In fact, if the behavior of such particles can be described using a simple mathematical formalism, in my opinion, that is reductionism at its finest. We have reduced the apparently complicated motion of, for example, a dog, into the movement of particles according to simple formulas. Simple mathematically describable behavior patterns, though non-physical (if you insist on categorizing them that way), are not magic.
I feel as if I may be missing the point, because I didn’t become confused after reading your questions. Please clarify, if I did miss the point.
What is left after the reduction is complete? Some irreducible objects (the Greek word is atom) and what? Why do these “atoms” behave the way they do? Are the rules of atomic behavior part of the Nature? Or of our description of it?
I strongly suspect that what is left is not an irreducible “object” in the common sense, but rather that the part about how these atoms behave the way they do is all that is left after a fully complete reduction. No object-style “atom”, only the behavior. The behavior is the atom.
Does that help?
Basically, the way I understand it, you don’t reduce to quarks and leptons, and then wonder “But how oh how do these quarks do this and that? Why do they do it?”. Instead, you reduce to the wave function, and there is no quark left, and nothing left to explain; the behavior of the quark explains both our perception of the presence of some “object”, and the interactions / rules / physical laws.
So, suppose you finally added that elusive last term in the equations of the Theory of Everything, and there is nothing to the Universe but “the behavior”. You press “Run” and the computers running your model produce a beautiful multiverse out of nothing. Where are the computers and who pressed “Run” to create the universe we live in?
To me, the hypothesis “X” where X is an event/behavior is simpler than “R(X)” where R is an overarching something that executes the rules of X. I should then prefer a model of the universe where there is no overarching thinghy that runs behaviors, just the behaviors behaving, over the other way around.
This sounds like there’s just some confusion somewhere. If the behavior is a fundamental “Do(X)” and nothing else, then why does there need to be anything above or around that executes or hits run on the behaviors outside the simulation?
The ability to simulate X using R(X) is only very weak evidence that X requires R() (or any R’ ) to function.
The laws are in the map, of course (if it came from mind, it is necessarily of a map). And what we call the ‘territory’ is a map itself. The map/territory distinction is just a useful analogy for explaining that our models of reality aren’t necessarily reality (whatever that actually is). Also, keep in mind that there are many incompatible meanings for ‘reductionism’. A lot of LWers (like anonymous1) use it in a way that’s not in line with EY, and EY uses it in a way that’s not in line with philosophy (which is where I suspect most LWers get their definition of it from).
And if the physical laws are in the map, what represents them in the territory?
Good question. A description is sufficient for execution, but what executes the description?
Surely territory is just another name for reality?
I think you misinterpreted me. Territory is just another name for reality, but reality is just a name and so is territory. By nature of names coming from mind, they are maps because they can’t perfectly represent whatever actually is (or more accurately, we can’t confirm our representations as perfectly representational and we possibly can’t form perfect representations). Also, by saying “actually is,” I’m creating a map, too—but I hope you infer what I mean. The methods by which we as humans receive and transform our state is imperfect and therefore uncertainty is injected into any thing we do, and furthermore by talking of “reality” (as it actually is) we assume no limitations of human-minds or general-mind-design that prevent us from forming what actually is within the constraints of our minds and general-mind-design.
Indeed, what? Is there an underlying computing substrate, which is more “real” than the territory?
Essentially, my question was a syncretization of the five ways. I.e., at the meta-level, what causes? Some people like Aquinas say that such a cause entails that it has the most important properties ascribed to their God (and consequently they pattern match “what causes” to their God). I don’t take that view, though. I just think (i.e., a hunch) there’s something there to explain and that it probably necessitates a teleological worldview at the meta-level if it is to be explained. I don’t know.
Prompted by this comment, looking for references on the reductionism and the laws of nature, specifically, to address this argument:
Basically, where do the laws of “fundamental” physics fit in the map/territory model (trying to steel-man it for myself, given that I’m not a fan)? If they are in the territory, what does the ultimate reduction look like? Is Nature just a fancy mathematical formula and some initial conditions, Tegmark-style? And if the physical laws are in the map, what represents them in the territory?
I don’t have any references, but I’ll share my view:
The way the particles are actually behaving is part of the territory, the mathematical symbols we use to describe such behavior are part of the map.
And I don’t see how this calls the whole idea of reductionism into question. In fact, if the behavior of such particles can be described using a simple mathematical formalism, in my opinion, that is reductionism at its finest. We have reduced the apparently complicated motion of, for example, a dog, into the movement of particles according to simple formulas. Simple mathematically describable behavior patterns, though non-physical (if you insist on categorizing them that way), are not magic.
I feel as if I may be missing the point, because I didn’t become confused after reading your questions. Please clarify, if I did miss the point.
What is left after the reduction is complete? Some irreducible objects (the Greek word is atom) and what? Why do these “atoms” behave the way they do? Are the rules of atomic behavior part of the Nature? Or of our description of it?
I strongly suspect that what is left is not an irreducible “object” in the common sense, but rather that the part about how these atoms behave the way they do is all that is left after a fully complete reduction. No object-style “atom”, only the behavior. The behavior is the atom.
Does that help?
Basically, the way I understand it, you don’t reduce to quarks and leptons, and then wonder “But how oh how do these quarks do this and that? Why do they do it?”. Instead, you reduce to the wave function, and there is no quark left, and nothing left to explain; the behavior of the quark explains both our perception of the presence of some “object”, and the interactions / rules / physical laws.
So, suppose you finally added that elusive last term in the equations of the Theory of Everything, and there is nothing to the Universe but “the behavior”. You press “Run” and the computers running your model produce a beautiful multiverse out of nothing. Where are the computers and who pressed “Run” to create the universe we live in?
I don’t know how to answer that.
To me, the hypothesis “X” where X is an event/behavior is simpler than “R(X)” where R is an overarching something that executes the rules of X. I should then prefer a model of the universe where there is no overarching thinghy that runs behaviors, just the behaviors behaving, over the other way around.
This sounds like there’s just some confusion somewhere. If the behavior is a fundamental “Do(X)” and nothing else, then why does there need to be anything above or around that executes or hits run on the behaviors outside the simulation?
The ability to simulate X using R(X) is only very weak evidence that X requires R() (or any R’ ) to function.
The laws are in the map, of course (if it came from mind, it is necessarily of a map). And what we call the ‘territory’ is a map itself. The map/territory distinction is just a useful analogy for explaining that our models of reality aren’t necessarily reality (whatever that actually is). Also, keep in mind that there are many incompatible meanings for ‘reductionism’. A lot of LWers (like anonymous1) use it in a way that’s not in line with EY, and EY uses it in a way that’s not in line with philosophy (which is where I suspect most LWers get their definition of it from).
Good question. A description is sufficient for execution, but what executes the description?
I read this the other day...very thought-provoking.
I think a realist would take issue with this statement… Surely territory is just another name for reality?
Indeed, what? Is there an underlying computing substrate, which is more “real” than the territory?
I think you misinterpreted me. Territory is just another name for reality, but reality is just a name and so is territory. By nature of names coming from mind, they are maps because they can’t perfectly represent whatever actually is (or more accurately, we can’t confirm our representations as perfectly representational and we possibly can’t form perfect representations). Also, by saying “actually is,” I’m creating a map, too—but I hope you infer what I mean. The methods by which we as humans receive and transform our state is imperfect and therefore uncertainty is injected into any thing we do, and furthermore by talking of “reality” (as it actually is) we assume no limitations of human-minds or general-mind-design that prevent us from forming what actually is within the constraints of our minds and general-mind-design.
Essentially, my question was a syncretization of the five ways. I.e., at the meta-level, what causes? Some people like Aquinas say that such a cause entails that it has the most important properties ascribed to their God (and consequently they pattern match “what causes” to their God). I don’t take that view, though. I just think (i.e., a hunch) there’s something there to explain and that it probably necessitates a teleological worldview at the meta-level if it is to be explained. I don’t know.