2a—If volition depends on emotional state, what we want is a me+ who is able to have any of these emotional states, but is not stuck in any one of them. Me+ will grok the states of chocolate-in-hand, chocolate-in-mouth, and fat-on-hips, taking on each emotional set in turn, and then consider the duration as well as the character of each experience. I don’t see this as especially problematic, beyond the way that every psychological simulation/prediction is challenging.
3a—Not all psychological changes are problematic for what matters. Parfit has been criticized (unfairly?) on this very point, especially when it comes to changes that are increases in knowledge and rationality. (It may be a misreading of him to infer that all changes count as decreased connectedness over time.) Whenever we try to reason out what it is that we really want, we show a commitment to rationality. We can hardly complain if our criterion of “what we really want” includes increased rationality on the search path.
4c—If “want to want” can’t be leveraged into just plain want, in the agent’s most rational moments, I suspect it’s just hot air. Sometimes “akrasia” isn’t, and stated goals are sometimes abandoned on reflection.
2a—If volition depends on emotional state, what we want is a me+ who is able to have any of these emotional states, but is not stuck in any one of them. Me+ will grok the states of chocolate-in-hand, chocolate-in-mouth, and fat-on-hips, taking on each emotional set in turn, and then consider the duration as well as the character of each experience. I don’t see this as especially problematic, beyond the way that every psychological simulation/prediction is challenging.
3a—Not all psychological changes are problematic for what matters. Parfit has been criticized (unfairly?) on this very point, especially when it comes to changes that are increases in knowledge and rationality. (It may be a misreading of him to infer that all changes count as decreased connectedness over time.) Whenever we try to reason out what it is that we really want, we show a commitment to rationality. We can hardly complain if our criterion of “what we really want” includes increased rationality on the search path.
4c—If “want to want” can’t be leveraged into just plain want, in the agent’s most rational moments, I suspect it’s just hot air. Sometimes “akrasia” isn’t, and stated goals are sometimes abandoned on reflection.