I don’t think the argument is parallel. Instead, consider:
If you’re giving to charity anyway, give to the charity that has the highest expected impact. If you’re voting anyway, vote for the candidate with the highest expected impact.
Here, you have optimal philanthropy plus voting against lizards.
But there is no analog to splitting up your vote, and to the extent that there can be (say, when you get multiple votes in an election to fill multiple co-equal seats on a council, and you can apply more than one of your votes to the same candidate), and several candidates have similar merit, the same arguments for charity splitting apply.
Sure (to the extent that we are considering the effects of “what if everyone used the algorithm I’m using”): you vote for the Greens with probability p and for the Blues with probability 1 - p.
I don’t think the argument is parallel. Instead, consider:
Here, you have optimal philanthropy plus voting against lizards.
But there is no analog to splitting up your vote, and to the extent that there can be (say, when you get multiple votes in an election to fill multiple co-equal seats on a council, and you can apply more than one of your votes to the same candidate), and several candidates have similar merit, the same arguments for charity splitting apply.
Sure (to the extent that we are considering the effects of “what if everyone used the algorithm I’m using”): you vote for the Greens with probability p and for the Blues with probability 1 - p.