Maybe I’m confused here, but I thought that if two TDT agents play this game (or, for that matter, two UDT agents that can read each other’s source code), the only relevant payoffs are C/C = 2⁄2, D/D = 0⁄0, so Cooperate clearly dominates.
Remember, a UDT player that can predict the other’s decision algorithm will precommit to the dominant joint strategy (C/C or D/D) if the other player will respond accordingly.
A TDT player will do so even when the other player’s exact algorithm is opaque, because the other player is presumed to be making a decision with an analogous algorithm and the same information, so e.g. if you cooperate, there’s no reason not to assume the other player will make the same choice given the same incentives.
Maybe I’m confused here, but I thought that if two TDT agents play this game (or, for that matter, two UDT agents that can read each other’s source code), the only relevant payoffs are C/C = 2⁄2, D/D = 0⁄0, so Cooperate clearly dominates.
Remember, a UDT player that can predict the other’s decision algorithm will precommit to the dominant joint strategy (C/C or D/D) if the other player will respond accordingly.
A TDT player will do so even when the other player’s exact algorithm is opaque, because the other player is presumed to be making a decision with an analogous algorithm and the same information, so e.g. if you cooperate, there’s no reason not to assume the other player will make the same choice given the same incentives.