I don’t much care for discussions about points, but I think using the “God” label to refer to whatever it was that caused (assuming, as you say, that there actually was any causal factor) there to be something rather than nothing unavoidably introduces, via implicit associations, certain assumptions and constraints to the ensuing discussion.
If this is unintended, it’s a sloppy use of language; if it’s intended, it’s a sneaky one. This might account for people thinking poorly of your comment.
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Many theists of my acquaintance, if somehow convinced of the existence of an impersonal mindless process that caused everything to come into being, would not conclude “Ah! God is this particular impersonal mindless process. Now we know,” and continue more or less as before, but would instead either stop identifying as theists, or continue to believe that “God” refers to some mindful entity that is in some as-yet-not-understood way really responsible.
Similarly, of the many theists who identified “God” as the entity responsible for the origin of life before an impersonal mindless process was shown to be responsible for that, some rejected the evidence, some gave up theism, and some concluded that “God” properly refers to some other entity. (And, yes, some generalized their understanding of God to include that process, and some had an understanding of God that was already sufficiently general to include that process. My point is merely that they are the minority.)
I don’t think I was being sloppy or sneaky, since the specific assumptions going into the word God were mainly what my comment was about.
On the one hand, you can package a lot of very specific/extreme things into “God” and have a straw man that is easy to knock down. What should be packed into belief in “God’?? I think it should be some combination of what is generally meant and what is most charitable for the argument (that is, if something is asserted about God in general, it should be true for the narrowest meaning, or qualifiers should be added).
Consider the statement in question of whether the concept of God is a privileged hypothesis. In evaluating that, you wouldn’t consider a specific God—someone doesn’t sit down and hypothesize all the details of the trinity. Rather, they begin with something basic (like there seems to be a first cause, or agency in events) and then they proceed from there (these latter things would be deductions, faulty or not).
My image is that of a primitive man wondering why it rains when it does and then deciding that the rain-maker must like bugs because they swarm after the rains. There’s definitely a distinction to be made between God-in-the-abstract and a specific God with all details sketched in. The answer to his question is naturalistic (clouds, weather patterns) but with a little philosophy the man can decide that what he still doesn’t know why there is rain at all, and that this deeper question was some component of his original question.
When people consider whether God is a privileged hypothesis, I think they really ask this for a very minimalist concept of God. Because if a specific God is meant, with all the particulars that different religions argue over, then it would not be a very interesting statement.
Any definition of God that’s remotely connected to what people throughout history have meant by the concept must include (I believe) some characteristics that we would recognize as personhood, intelligence, purpose. Also atleast one of the following : superior power, superior wisdom, superior level of existence (to be superior to humans in atleast some way*).
“first cause” however is far, far, from being a universal characteristic of imagined Gods—many ancient pantheons had their various Gods (even their supreme Gods) being born, growing up, occasionally overthrowing previous gods, etc.
So a minimalist concept of God wouldn’t be limited to “first cause”, and I don’t think it should even include it as one of its elements.
If you want to describe a non-necessarily intelligent, non-necessarily purposeful “first cause”, I would very strongly advise you not to use the word “God”.
OK … there’s been sufficient unanimity in responses, I will update my understanding of the question ‘is the concept of God a privileged hypothesis?’ to mean a God that is again personal and mindful. A God that is like a human being (but superior) is clearly a privileged hypothesis, reflecting the limitations of human psychology and imagination, and I have no reason to challenge that.
There really appears to be nothing to argue about regarding atheism/theism. I’ll keep on the lookout though.
Two things.
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I don’t much care for discussions about points, but I think using the “God” label to refer to whatever it was that caused (assuming, as you say, that there actually was any causal factor) there to be something rather than nothing unavoidably introduces, via implicit associations, certain assumptions and constraints to the ensuing discussion.
If this is unintended, it’s a sloppy use of language; if it’s intended, it’s a sneaky one. This might account for people thinking poorly of your comment.
==
Many theists of my acquaintance, if somehow convinced of the existence of an impersonal mindless process that caused everything to come into being, would not conclude “Ah! God is this particular impersonal mindless process. Now we know,” and continue more or less as before, but would instead either stop identifying as theists, or continue to believe that “God” refers to some mindful entity that is in some as-yet-not-understood way really responsible.
Similarly, of the many theists who identified “God” as the entity responsible for the origin of life before an impersonal mindless process was shown to be responsible for that, some rejected the evidence, some gave up theism, and some concluded that “God” properly refers to some other entity. (And, yes, some generalized their understanding of God to include that process, and some had an understanding of God that was already sufficiently general to include that process. My point is merely that they are the minority.)
Thanks for the reply.
I don’t think I was being sloppy or sneaky, since the specific assumptions going into the word God were mainly what my comment was about.
On the one hand, you can package a lot of very specific/extreme things into “God” and have a straw man that is easy to knock down. What should be packed into belief in “God’?? I think it should be some combination of what is generally meant and what is most charitable for the argument (that is, if something is asserted about God in general, it should be true for the narrowest meaning, or qualifiers should be added).
Consider the statement in question of whether the concept of God is a privileged hypothesis. In evaluating that, you wouldn’t consider a specific God—someone doesn’t sit down and hypothesize all the details of the trinity. Rather, they begin with something basic (like there seems to be a first cause, or agency in events) and then they proceed from there (these latter things would be deductions, faulty or not).
My image is that of a primitive man wondering why it rains when it does and then deciding that the rain-maker must like bugs because they swarm after the rains. There’s definitely a distinction to be made between God-in-the-abstract and a specific God with all details sketched in. The answer to his question is naturalistic (clouds, weather patterns) but with a little philosophy the man can decide that what he still doesn’t know why there is rain at all, and that this deeper question was some component of his original question.
When people consider whether God is a privileged hypothesis, I think they really ask this for a very minimalist concept of God. Because if a specific God is meant, with all the particulars that different religions argue over, then it would not be a very interesting statement.
Any definition of God that’s remotely connected to what people throughout history have meant by the concept must include (I believe) some characteristics that we would recognize as personhood, intelligence, purpose. Also atleast one of the following : superior power, superior wisdom, superior level of existence (to be superior to humans in atleast some way*).
“first cause” however is far, far, from being a universal characteristic of imagined Gods—many ancient pantheons had their various Gods (even their supreme Gods) being born, growing up, occasionally overthrowing previous gods, etc.
So a minimalist concept of God wouldn’t be limited to “first cause”, and I don’t think it should even include it as one of its elements.
If you want to describe a non-necessarily intelligent, non-necessarily purposeful “first cause”, I would very strongly advise you not to use the word “God”.
OK … there’s been sufficient unanimity in responses, I will update my understanding of the question ‘is the concept of God a privileged hypothesis?’ to mean a God that is again personal and mindful. A God that is like a human being (but superior) is clearly a privileged hypothesis, reflecting the limitations of human psychology and imagination, and I have no reason to challenge that.
There really appears to be nothing to argue about regarding atheism/theism. I’ll keep on the lookout though.