re: 4, I dunno about simple, but it seems to me that you most robustly reduce the amount of bad stuff that will happen to you in the future by just not acting on any particular threats you can envision. As I mentioned there’s a bit of a “once you pay the danegeld” effect where giving in to the most extortion-happy agents incentivizes other agents to start counter-extorting you. Intuitively the most extortion-happy agents seem likely to be a minority in the greater cosmos for acausal normalcy reasons, so I think this effect dominates. And I note that you seem to have conceded that even in the mainline scenario you can envision there will be some complicated bargaining process among multiple possible future SIs which seems to increase the odds of acausal normalcy type arguments applying. But again I think an even more important argument is that we have little insight into possible extorters and what they would want us to do, and how much of our measure is in various simulations etc(bonus argument, maybe most of our measure is in ~human-aligned simulations since people who like humans can increase their utility and bargain by running us, whereas extorters would rather use the resources for something else). Anyway, I feel like we have gone over our main cruxes by now. Eliezer’s argument is probably an “acausal normalcy” type one, he’s written about acausal coalitions against utility-function-inverters in planecrash.
Do you not think that causing their existence is something they are likely to want?
But who is they? There’s a bunch of possible different future SIs(or if there isn’t, they have no reason to extort us). Making one more likely makes another less likely.
I don’t think we have much reason to think of all non-human-values-having entities as being particularly natural allies, relative to human-valuers who plausibly have a plurality of local control. I think you might be lumping non-human-valuers together in ‘far mode’ since we know little about them, but a priori they are likely about as different from each other as from human-valuers. There may also be a sizable moral-realist or welfare-valuing contingent even if they don’t value humans per se. There may also be a general acausal norm against extortion since it moves away from the pareto frontier of everyone’s values.
Comment withdrawn.
re: 4, I dunno about simple, but it seems to me that you most robustly reduce the amount of bad stuff that will happen to you in the future by just not acting on any particular threats you can envision. As I mentioned there’s a bit of a “once you pay the danegeld” effect where giving in to the most extortion-happy agents incentivizes other agents to start counter-extorting you. Intuitively the most extortion-happy agents seem likely to be a minority in the greater cosmos for acausal normalcy reasons, so I think this effect dominates. And I note that you seem to have conceded that even in the mainline scenario you can envision there will be some complicated bargaining process among multiple possible future SIs which seems to increase the odds of acausal normalcy type arguments applying. But again I think an even more important argument is that we have little insight into possible extorters and what they would want us to do, and how much of our measure is in various simulations etc(bonus argument, maybe most of our measure is in ~human-aligned simulations since people who like humans can increase their utility and bargain by running us, whereas extorters would rather use the resources for something else). Anyway, I feel like we have gone over our main cruxes by now. Eliezer’s argument is probably an “acausal normalcy” type one, he’s written about acausal coalitions against utility-function-inverters in planecrash.
Comment withdrawn.
But who is they? There’s a bunch of possible different future SIs(or if there isn’t, they have no reason to extort us). Making one more likely makes another less likely.
Comment withdrawn.
OK but if all you can do is slightly perturb it then it has no reason to threaten you either.
Comment withdrawn.
OK, so then so would whatever other entity is counterfactually getting more eventual control. But now we’re going in circles.
Comment withdrawn. r the purpose of this conversation.
I don’t think we have much reason to think of all non-human-values-having entities as being particularly natural allies, relative to human-valuers who plausibly have a plurality of local control. I think you might be lumping non-human-valuers together in ‘far mode’ since we know little about them, but a priori they are likely about as different from each other as from human-valuers. There may also be a sizable moral-realist or welfare-valuing contingent even if they don’t value humans per se. There may also be a general acausal norm against extortion since it moves away from the pareto frontier of everyone’s values.