especially if TSMC’s fabs get bombed, but if the conflict isn’t centrally about AI I think there’s a good chance they’ll survive.
I remember reading somewhere that the U.S. / Taiwanese government plan is to render the fabs permanently unusable if Taiwan changes hands. Given the rise in official/unofficial acts of industrial warfare, and the escalating targeting of nonmilitary shipping during the ongoing conflict in Eastern Europe, I would certainly expect this to happen.
Additionally, in regard to industrial sabotage, the historical vulnerability of U.S. infrastructure might be worth considering. Considering the wide array of groups that consider the U.S. government to be their enemy (or at least unworthy of loyalty), not to mention the substantial portion of foreign nationals with loyalty to potentially pro-China home countries, sabotage of U.S. infrastructure could very rapidly hit catastrophic levels if the PRC started offering bounties or leaning on people to act. There have been numerous embarrassing stories of late in which members of the U.S. military who were originally from China sold or gave classified intelligence to China, and there doesn’t seem to have been any serious discussion from the security establishment about how to prevent a much more catastrophic version of this from happening during a war.
Depending on your outlook with regard to the competence of the U.S. security establishment, the lack of concern there is indicative of either extreme certainty that a war with China will not occur, or an indicator that such a war might go very badly for the U.S. government much earlier than we would expect. The former means that we might see higher-than-expected stability in the chip market even as the Pax Americana disappears, and the latter means that China would essentially be able to decide the rate of AI progress unilaterally from then on.
I remember reading somewhere that the U.S. / Taiwanese government plan is to render the fabs permanently unusable if Taiwan changes hands.
Yes, to clarify, when I said “I think there’s a good chance they’ll survive” I was referring to Chinese fabs—I expect the Taiwanese fabs to be destroyed.
I largely agree with your other points, I think the US is extremely vulnerable to sabotage and has not been taking the issue seriously enough. My main hope in this regard is that China might decide to hold off from targeting civilian infrastructure out of fear of the US’s response.
I remember reading somewhere that the U.S. / Taiwanese government plan is to render the fabs permanently unusable if Taiwan changes hands. Given the rise in official/unofficial acts of industrial warfare, and the escalating targeting of nonmilitary shipping during the ongoing conflict in Eastern Europe, I would certainly expect this to happen.
Additionally, in regard to industrial sabotage, the historical vulnerability of U.S. infrastructure might be worth considering. Considering the wide array of groups that consider the U.S. government to be their enemy (or at least unworthy of loyalty), not to mention the substantial portion of foreign nationals with loyalty to potentially pro-China home countries, sabotage of U.S. infrastructure could very rapidly hit catastrophic levels if the PRC started offering bounties or leaning on people to act. There have been numerous embarrassing stories of late in which members of the U.S. military who were originally from China sold or gave classified intelligence to China, and there doesn’t seem to have been any serious discussion from the security establishment about how to prevent a much more catastrophic version of this from happening during a war.
Depending on your outlook with regard to the competence of the U.S. security establishment, the lack of concern there is indicative of either extreme certainty that a war with China will not occur, or an indicator that such a war might go very badly for the U.S. government much earlier than we would expect. The former means that we might see higher-than-expected stability in the chip market even as the Pax Americana disappears, and the latter means that China would essentially be able to decide the rate of AI progress unilaterally from then on.
Yes, to clarify, when I said “I think there’s a good chance they’ll survive” I was referring to Chinese fabs—I expect the Taiwanese fabs to be destroyed.
I largely agree with your other points, I think the US is extremely vulnerable to sabotage and has not been taking the issue seriously enough. My main hope in this regard is that China might decide to hold off from targeting civilian infrastructure out of fear of the US’s response.