Is the difference that, if (3) held, then there could be only one correct “process of reflection” of the kind described in (4), so that this one process would be the only correct path for all pre-rational intelligent agents to take to become rational?
Yes, or at least there are right and wrong ways to reflect on what one wants, so that even if someone were to reach reflective equilibrium via a convergent process, it would make sense to say that they did it wrong and ended up with wrong values (or “wrong values for them”).
even if someone were to reach reflective equilibrium via a convergent process, it would make sense to say that they did it wrong and ended up with wrong values (or “wrong values for them”).
Thanks. I can sort-of imagine that some, but not all, ways of reaching reflective equilibrium could be “wrong”, even if the values held in that equilibrium state could not be said to be “wrong”.
But, under hypotheses (3), that’s the most we could say, right? How could we go on to say that the agent ended up with “wrong values” if, under hypothesis (3), there is no fact of the matter about which values are “wrong”?
Or maybe a scenario (2.5) could be added intermediate between your (2) and your (3). Under this scenario, as in (3), there are no facts about what everyone should value. Nonetheless, for each individual agent, there is a fact about what that agent should value. However, as in (2), the typical agent will not converge exactly on its “correct” values. Instead, the typical agent will converge on its values “along with idiosyncratic values”.
Yes, or at least there are right and wrong ways to reflect on what one wants, so that even if someone were to reach reflective equilibrium via a convergent process, it would make sense to say that they did it wrong and ended up with wrong values (or “wrong values for them”).
Thanks. I can sort-of imagine that some, but not all, ways of reaching reflective equilibrium could be “wrong”, even if the values held in that equilibrium state could not be said to be “wrong”.
But, under hypotheses (3), that’s the most we could say, right? How could we go on to say that the agent ended up with “wrong values” if, under hypothesis (3), there is no fact of the matter about which values are “wrong”?
Or maybe a scenario (2.5) could be added intermediate between your (2) and your (3). Under this scenario, as in (3), there are no facts about what everyone should value. Nonetheless, for each individual agent, there is a fact about what that agent should value. However, as in (2), the typical agent will not converge exactly on its “correct” values. Instead, the typical agent will converge on its values “along with idiosyncratic values”.