Just to clarify, I am not the author of the original article; I haven’t proposed any particular naive decision theory. (I don’t think “treat indexicals as suspect” qualifies as one!)
Unfortunately, my mind is not the product of a clearthinking AI and my values do (for good or ill) have indexically-defined stuff in them: I care more about myself than about random other people, for instance. That may or may not be coherent, but it’s how I am. And so I don’t know what the “right” way to get indexicals out of the rest of my thinking would be. And so I’m not sure how I “should” bet in the presumptuous philosopher case. (I take it the situation you have in mind is that someone offers me to bet me at 10:1 odds that we’re in the Few People scenario rather than the Many People scenario, or something of the kind.) But, for what it’s worth, I think I take the P.P.’s side, while darkly suspecting I’m making a serious mistake :-). I repeat that my thinking on this stuff is all much less than half-baked.
I realized this, but I think my mind attached some of snarles’ statements to you.
I agree with your choice in the presumptuous philosopher problem, but I doubt that anyone could actually be in such an epistemic state, basically because the Few People cannot be sure that there is not another universe with completely different laws of physics simulating many copies of theirs, as well as many other qualitatively similar possible scenarios.
Just to clarify, I am not the author of the original article; I haven’t proposed any particular naive decision theory. (I don’t think “treat indexicals as suspect” qualifies as one!)
Unfortunately, my mind is not the product of a clearthinking AI and my values do (for good or ill) have indexically-defined stuff in them: I care more about myself than about random other people, for instance. That may or may not be coherent, but it’s how I am. And so I don’t know what the “right” way to get indexicals out of the rest of my thinking would be. And so I’m not sure how I “should” bet in the presumptuous philosopher case. (I take it the situation you have in mind is that someone offers me to bet me at 10:1 odds that we’re in the Few People scenario rather than the Many People scenario, or something of the kind.) But, for what it’s worth, I think I take the P.P.’s side, while darkly suspecting I’m making a serious mistake :-). I repeat that my thinking on this stuff is all much less than half-baked.
I realized this, but I think my mind attached some of snarles’ statements to you.
I agree with your choice in the presumptuous philosopher problem, but I doubt that anyone could actually be in such an epistemic state, basically because the Few People cannot be sure that there is not another universe with completely different laws of physics simulating many copies of theirs, as well as many other qualitatively similar possible scenarios.