The map/territory distinction is a metaphor that illustrates the correspondence theory of truth which Eliezer endorses but I am unsure of.
Its role in the sequences seems much simpler: if you look at human minds as devices for producing correct (winning) decisions (beliefs), the “map” aspect of the brain is effective to the extent/because the state of the brain corresponds to the state of the territory. This is not correspondence theory of truth, it’s theory of (arranging) coincidence between correct decisions/beliefs (things defined in terms of the territory) and actual decisions/beliefs (made by the brain involving its “map” aspect), that points out that it normally takes physical reasons to correlate the two.
I like how you’ve put this. This is roughly how I see things, and what I thought was intended by The Simple Truth, but recently someone pointed me to a post where Eliezer seems to endorse the correspondence theory instead of the thing you said (which I’m tempted to classify as a pragmatist theory of truth, but it doesn’t matter).
My point is that the role of map/territory distinction is not specifically to illustrate the correspondence theory of truth. I don’t see how the linked post disagrees with what I said, as its subject matter is truth (among other things), and I didn’t talk about truth, instead I said some apparently true things about the process of forming beliefs and decisions, as seen “from the outside”. If we then mark the beliefs that correspond to territory, those fulfilling their epistemic role, as “true”, correspondence theory of truth naturally follows.
Its role in the sequences seems much simpler: if you look at human minds as devices for producing correct (winning) decisions (beliefs), the “map” aspect of the brain is effective to the extent/because the state of the brain corresponds to the state of the territory. This is not correspondence theory of truth, it’s theory of (arranging) coincidence between correct decisions/beliefs (things defined in terms of the territory) and actual decisions/beliefs (made by the brain involving its “map” aspect), that points out that it normally takes physical reasons to correlate the two.
I like how you’ve put this. This is roughly how I see things, and what I thought was intended by The Simple Truth, but recently someone pointed me to a post where Eliezer seems to endorse the correspondence theory instead of the thing you said (which I’m tempted to classify as a pragmatist theory of truth, but it doesn’t matter).
My point is that the role of map/territory distinction is not specifically to illustrate the correspondence theory of truth. I don’t see how the linked post disagrees with what I said, as its subject matter is truth (among other things), and I didn’t talk about truth, instead I said some apparently true things about the process of forming beliefs and decisions, as seen “from the outside”. If we then mark the beliefs that correspond to territory, those fulfilling their epistemic role, as “true”, correspondence theory of truth naturally follows.