Naturalism is presupposed by all or nearly all promoted Less Wrong posts, and certainly by all of Eliezer’s posts. I don’t know what the prospects are for fair treatment of dissenters.
Here is a quick overview of Quine on postmodernism. On Quine on useless debates about the meaning of terms, see Quine: A guide for the perplexed.
There are lots of meanings of naturalism, explored for example in Ritchie’s Understanding Naturalism. What I mean by ‘Quinean naturalism’ is summed up in the original post.
As for reductionism—I mean this kind of reductionism. The (2) kind of reductionism you mentioned is, of course, that second dogma of empiricism that Quine famously attacked (the 1st being analyticity). And that is not what I mean by reductionism.
I’m working on a post on intuitions where my positions on them will become clearer.
As for philosophy being about cognitive science, I’d have to write at great length to explain, I suppose. I’ll probably write a post on that for my blog Common Sense Atheism, at which time I’ll try to remember to come back here and link to it.
Since you don’t recommend reading Quine directly, what books / other resources would you recommend for someone who wants to read the main arguments for and against naturalism? My only knowledge of the subject comes from the sequences (and it seems like those mostly take it for granted).
If you feel you’re really not confident that people are made of atoms and so on, and you want an introduction to the standard debates over naturalism in mainstream philosophy, you can start with Ritchie’s Understanding Naturalism.
If you change your mind and want a quick and relatively readable tour from the man himself, try Quine’s From Stimulus to Science.
Can’t think of a succinct critique specifically of Quinean naturalism off hand. John McDowell articulates one in his Mind and World summarized here , but this text is not for the faint of heart. For a nice and relatively readable discussion of a couple of views of rationality, have a look at the chapter ‘Two conceptions of rationality’ in Hilary Putnam’s Reason Truth and History
Appreciate the reply. I think the point remains that what one means by ‘naturalism’ may have implications for what one can say about the nature of rationality, and this is something the denizens of this blog might care about.
Answering your questions in order...
Naturalism is presupposed by all or nearly all promoted Less Wrong posts, and certainly by all of Eliezer’s posts. I don’t know what the prospects are for fair treatment of dissenters.
Here is a quick overview of Quine on postmodernism. On Quine on useless debates about the meaning of terms, see Quine: A guide for the perplexed.
There are lots of meanings of naturalism, explored for example in Ritchie’s Understanding Naturalism. What I mean by ‘Quinean naturalism’ is summed up in the original post.
As for reductionism—I mean this kind of reductionism. The (2) kind of reductionism you mentioned is, of course, that second dogma of empiricism that Quine famously attacked (the 1st being analyticity). And that is not what I mean by reductionism.
I’m working on a post on intuitions where my positions on them will become clearer.
As for philosophy being about cognitive science, I’d have to write at great length to explain, I suppose. I’ll probably write a post on that for my blog Common Sense Atheism, at which time I’ll try to remember to come back here and link to it.
Since you don’t recommend reading Quine directly, what books / other resources would you recommend for someone who wants to read the main arguments for and against naturalism? My only knowledge of the subject comes from the sequences (and it seems like those mostly take it for granted).
If you feel you’re really not confident that people are made of atoms and so on, and you want an introduction to the standard debates over naturalism in mainstream philosophy, you can start with Ritchie’s Understanding Naturalism.
If you change your mind and want a quick and relatively readable tour from the man himself, try Quine’s From Stimulus to Science.
Can’t think of a succinct critique specifically of Quinean naturalism off hand. John McDowell articulates one in his Mind and World summarized here , but this text is not for the faint of heart. For a nice and relatively readable discussion of a couple of views of rationality, have a look at the chapter ‘Two conceptions of rationality’ in Hilary Putnam’s Reason Truth and History
Appreciate the reply. I think the point remains that what one means by ‘naturalism’ may have implications for what one can say about the nature of rationality, and this is something the denizens of this blog might care about.