I don’t blame you for thinking like this, though I do think the question of counterfactuals doesn’t actually have to be dissolved in principle, and is solvable in theory for empirical counterfactuals, which essentially is that the human intuition for counterfactuals is basically pointing to the fact that other worlds can exist that are different from our own.
(On how turing-computable functions can be made to support counterfactuals in a reasonable way, which is the first useful step to making a general theory)
I don’t blame you for thinking like this, though I do think the question of counterfactuals doesn’t actually have to be dissolved in principle, and is solvable in theory for empirical counterfactuals, which essentially is that the human intuition for counterfactuals is basically pointing to the fact that other worlds can exist that are different from our own.
More context is below:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/dZ3CYHnuwHTnb3c96/noosphere89-s-shortform#CeQtNWEYnu44ucBMG
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mZy6AMgCw9CPjNCoK/computational-model-causal-diagrams-with-symmetry#Why_would_we_want_to_do_this_
(On how turing-computable functions can be made to support counterfactuals in a reasonable way, which is the first useful step to making a general theory)
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ZBYE2F5DBiZtj6m95/is-causality-in-the-map-or-the-territory
(This discusses to what extent counterfactuals are in the map vs territory, though it isn’t a natural frame to me)