For my own part, if I get to choose now between a future where something exists that remembers being me but has absolutely no continuity with my current body (that is, is not a “future-body descendant of now-me”), and a future where something exists that has continuity with my current body but does not remember being me, I choose the former. (Of course, both might suck, depending on other details.)
Whether either of them is “really me” seems like a confused question.
And, sure, within the space of possible configurations of a system with many fewer degrees of variation than I have, it’s possible to select the most me-like available configuration and identify with it on those grounds, which allows me to single out a particular Sim, or a particular ladybug, as being “me”. I consider this sort of identification to be similar to how people identify with a football team or a rock band, though, and not particularly relevant to what we’re talking about when we talk about preserving individual identity in an artificial matrix.
I consider this sort of identification to be similar to how people identify with a football team or a rock band, though, and not particularly relevant to what we’re talking about when we talk about preserving individual identity in an artificial matrix.
Now we’re getting somewhere! What I am trying to say is that when we are talking about preserving individual identity in an artificial matrix, we are mistakenly identifying with the copy because it closely resembles us, it’s “Team Me”, but really it is “Me” that we want to preserve, not Team Me.
Well, I agree that what gets preserved within an artificial matrix is in an important sense “Team Me” rather than “Me”. But I would say the same thing about what gets preserved within a future-body descendent of now-me.
Whereas it sounds like you would say that what gets preserved within a future-body descendent of now-me is really “Me” rather than “Team Me”… yes? If so, what grounds do you have for believing that?
More generally, I think the concept of “Me” as distinct from various degrees of “Team Me” membership is confused and doesn’t carve reality at its joints. There’s no such thing; all there is is various degrees of “Team Me” membership.
I also think that the degree of “Team Me” membership a Sim or a ladybug is capable of is radically different from (and inferior to) the degree of “Team Me” membership a high-fidelity copy of now-me or a future-body descendent of now-me can have, such that equating the two is importantly misleading, though in a technical sense accurate.
Whereas it sounds like you would say that what gets preserved within a future-body descendent of now-me is really “Me” rather than “Team Me”… yes? If so, what grounds do you have for believing that?...More generally, I think the concept of “Me” as distinct from various degrees of “Team Me” membership is confused and doesn’t carve reality at its joints. There’s no such thing; all there is is various degrees of “Team Me” membership.
Agh! You just killed “Me”! Thank you!
It is true, the only distinction that I had really made between Me and Team-Me was classical physical continuity, that is the only place I could see to draw a line. If there is no line, and yes, I fearfully agree with you on that, then my reason for uploading or freezing (aside from survival-instinct projection) is to preserve something that runs on the same or similar programming as the rest of Team-Me. From an objective point of view, I wouldn’t really consider my pattern worth preserving. What can Team Me do that a sufficiently advanced (and most likely more efficient) AI couldn’t do better?
You sound like you’re implicitly treating that “objective” point of view as more important than your actual (presumably subjective) point of view. Is that true? If so, on what grounds?
To answer your question, that is not true. The objective point of view and subjective points of view are equal, because they are just different points of view. If it sounds like I consider it more important, it is only because my mind actually does agree more with the objective view. At this point in time the subjective point of view is foreign to me. I find the big picture so fascinating that I become less concerned with my own part in it, but I don’t expect that of anyone but me. I am more interested in creating something good than preserving something flawed, even if that thing happens to be me.
I’m a rebel that way.
Thanks for clarifying.
For my own part, if I get to choose now between a future where something exists that remembers being me but has absolutely no continuity with my current body (that is, is not a “future-body descendant of now-me”), and a future where something exists that has continuity with my current body but does not remember being me, I choose the former. (Of course, both might suck, depending on other details.)
Whether either of them is “really me” seems like a confused question.
And, sure, within the space of possible configurations of a system with many fewer degrees of variation than I have, it’s possible to select the most me-like available configuration and identify with it on those grounds, which allows me to single out a particular Sim, or a particular ladybug, as being “me”. I consider this sort of identification to be similar to how people identify with a football team or a rock band, though, and not particularly relevant to what we’re talking about when we talk about preserving individual identity in an artificial matrix.
Now we’re getting somewhere! What I am trying to say is that when we are talking about preserving individual identity in an artificial matrix, we are mistakenly identifying with the copy because it closely resembles us, it’s “Team Me”, but really it is “Me” that we want to preserve, not Team Me.
Well, I agree that what gets preserved within an artificial matrix is in an important sense “Team Me” rather than “Me”. But I would say the same thing about what gets preserved within a future-body descendent of now-me.
Whereas it sounds like you would say that what gets preserved within a future-body descendent of now-me is really “Me” rather than “Team Me”… yes? If so, what grounds do you have for believing that?
More generally, I think the concept of “Me” as distinct from various degrees of “Team Me” membership is confused and doesn’t carve reality at its joints. There’s no such thing; all there is is various degrees of “Team Me” membership.
I also think that the degree of “Team Me” membership a Sim or a ladybug is capable of is radically different from (and inferior to) the degree of “Team Me” membership a high-fidelity copy of now-me or a future-body descendent of now-me can have, such that equating the two is importantly misleading, though in a technical sense accurate.
Agh! You just killed “Me”! Thank you! It is true, the only distinction that I had really made between Me and Team-Me was classical physical continuity, that is the only place I could see to draw a line. If there is no line, and yes, I fearfully agree with you on that, then my reason for uploading or freezing (aside from survival-instinct projection) is to preserve something that runs on the same or similar programming as the rest of Team-Me. From an objective point of view, I wouldn’t really consider my pattern worth preserving. What can Team Me do that a sufficiently advanced (and most likely more efficient) AI couldn’t do better?
You sound like you’re implicitly treating that “objective” point of view as more important than your actual (presumably subjective) point of view.
Is that true?
If so, on what grounds?
To answer your question, that is not true. The objective point of view and subjective points of view are equal, because they are just different points of view. If it sounds like I consider it more important, it is only because my mind actually does agree more with the objective view. At this point in time the subjective point of view is foreign to me. I find the big picture so fascinating that I become less concerned with my own part in it, but I don’t expect that of anyone but me. I am more interested in creating something good than preserving something flawed, even if that thing happens to be me.