I understand that every normative decision theory adopts the assumption (convenient fiction if you prefer) that the agent being advised is acting of “his own free will”. Otherwise, why bother advising?
Being a compatibilist, as I understand Holy Scripture (i.e. The Sequences) instructs me to be, I see no incompatibility between this “fiction” of free will and the similar fiction of determinism. They model reality at different levels.
For certain purposes, it is convenient to model myself and other “free agents” as totally free in our decisions, but not completely free in carrying out those decisions. For example, my free will ego may decide to quit smoking, but my determined id has some probability of overruling that decision.
Why the distinction between agents which are free and agents which have had their decisions made for them by a programmer, then? Are you talking about cases in which specific circumstances have hard-coded behavioral responses? Every decision every agent makes is ultimately made for it by the agent’s programmer; I suppose I’m wondering where you draw the line.
As a side note, I feel very uncomfortable seeing the sequences referred to as inviolable scripture, even in jest. In my head, it just screams “oh my god how could anyone ever be doing it this wrong arghhhhhh.”
I’m still trying to figure out what I think of that reaction, and do not mention it as a criticism. I think.
Why the distinction between agents which are free and agents which have had their decisions made for them by a programmer, then? Are you talking about cases in which specific circumstances have hard-coded behavioral responses? Every decision every agent makes is ultimately made for it by the agent’s programmer; I suppose I’m wondering where you draw the line.
I make the distinction because the distinction is important. The programmer makes decisions at one point in time, with his own goals and/or utility functions, and his own knowledge of the world. The agent makes decisions at a different point in time, based on different values and different knowledge of the world. A decision theory which advises the programmer is not superior to a decision theory which advises the agent. Those two decision theories are playing different games.
“Totally free” sounds like too free. You’re not free to actually decide at time T to “decide X at time T+1″ and then actually decide Y at time T+1, since that is against the laws of physics.
It’s my understanding that what goes through your head when you actually decide X at time T+1 is (approximately) what we call TDT. Or you can stick to CDT and not be able to make decisions for your future self.
I upvoted this because it seems to contain a grain of truth, but I’m nervous that someone before me had downvoted it. I don’t know whether that was because it actually is just completely wrong about what TDT is all about, or because you went a bit over the top with “against the laws of physics”.
I am relying on a notion of free will.
I understand that every normative decision theory adopts the assumption (convenient fiction if you prefer) that the agent being advised is acting of “his own free will”. Otherwise, why bother advising?
Being a compatibilist, as I understand Holy Scripture (i.e. The Sequences) instructs me to be, I see no incompatibility between this “fiction” of free will and the similar fiction of determinism. They model reality at different levels.
For certain purposes, it is convenient to model myself and other “free agents” as totally free in our decisions, but not completely free in carrying out those decisions. For example, my free will ego may decide to quit smoking, but my determined id has some probability of overruling that decision.
Why the distinction between agents which are free and agents which have had their decisions made for them by a programmer, then? Are you talking about cases in which specific circumstances have hard-coded behavioral responses? Every decision every agent makes is ultimately made for it by the agent’s programmer; I suppose I’m wondering where you draw the line.
As a side note, I feel very uncomfortable seeing the sequences referred to as inviolable scripture, even in jest. In my head, it just screams “oh my god how could anyone ever be doing it this wrong arghhhhhh.”
I’m still trying to figure out what I think of that reaction, and do not mention it as a criticism. I think.
I make the distinction because the distinction is important. The programmer makes decisions at one point in time, with his own goals and/or utility functions, and his own knowledge of the world. The agent makes decisions at a different point in time, based on different values and different knowledge of the world. A decision theory which advises the programmer is not superior to a decision theory which advises the agent. Those two decision theories are playing different games.
“Totally free” sounds like too free. You’re not free to actually decide at time T to “decide X at time T+1″ and then actually decide Y at time T+1, since that is against the laws of physics.
It’s my understanding that what goes through your head when you actually decide X at time T+1 is (approximately) what we call TDT. Or you can stick to CDT and not be able to make decisions for your future self.
I upvoted this because it seems to contain a grain of truth, but I’m nervous that someone before me had downvoted it. I don’t know whether that was because it actually is just completely wrong about what TDT is all about, or because you went a bit over the top with “against the laws of physics”.