So TDT is different from CDT only in cases where the game is perfectly symmetric? If you are playing a game that is roughly the symmetric PD, except that one guy’s payoffs are shifted by a tiny +epsilon, then they should both defect?
TDT is different from CDT whenever one needs to consider the interaction of multiple decisions made using the same TDT-based decision procedure. This applies both to competitions between agents, as in the case of Chicken, and to cases where an agent needs to make credible precommitments, as in Newcomb’s Problem.
In the case of an almost-symmetric PD, the TDT agents should still cooperate. To change that, you’d have to make the PD asymmetrical enough that the agents were no longer evaluating their options in the same way. If a change is small enough that a CDT agent wouldn’t change its strategy, TDT agents would also ignore it.
This doesn’t strike me as the world’s greatest explanation, but I can’t think of a better way to formulate it. Please let me know if there’s something that’s still unclear.
If a change is small enough that a CDT agent wouldn’t change its strategy, TDT agents would also ignore it.
This strikes me as a bit bizarre. You test whether a warped PD is still close enough to symmetric by asking whether a CDT agent still defects in order to decide whether a TDT agent should still cooperate? Are you sure you are not just making up these rules as you go?
Please let me know if there’s something that’s still unclear.
Much is unclear and very little seems to be coherently written down. What amazes me is that there is so much confidence given to something no one can explain clearly. So far, the only stable thing in your description of TDT is that it is better than CDT.
So TDT is different from CDT only in cases where the game is perfectly symmetric? If you are playing a game that is roughly the symmetric PD, except that one guy’s payoffs are shifted by a tiny +epsilon, then they should both defect?
TDT is different from CDT whenever one needs to consider the interaction of multiple decisions made using the same TDT-based decision procedure. This applies both to competitions between agents, as in the case of Chicken, and to cases where an agent needs to make credible precommitments, as in Newcomb’s Problem.
In the case of an almost-symmetric PD, the TDT agents should still cooperate. To change that, you’d have to make the PD asymmetrical enough that the agents were no longer evaluating their options in the same way. If a change is small enough that a CDT agent wouldn’t change its strategy, TDT agents would also ignore it.
This doesn’t strike me as the world’s greatest explanation, but I can’t think of a better way to formulate it. Please let me know if there’s something that’s still unclear.
This strikes me as a bit bizarre. You test whether a warped PD is still close enough to symmetric by asking whether a CDT agent still defects in order to decide whether a TDT agent should still cooperate? Are you sure you are not just making up these rules as you go?
Much is unclear and very little seems to be coherently written down. What amazes me is that there is so much confidence given to something no one can explain clearly. So far, the only stable thing in your description of TDT is that it is better than CDT.