This is missing a key feature of substrate dependence, namely the role of time in the universe. What is implicit in the substrate, is that it exists in the universe. By existing in the universe, it must “flow” through time. And it is this connection to time that is key to its role in consciousness.
Take the standard thought experiment of a simulated digital mind. Is this mind conscious? Well here is the thing about “digital existence”: it lies outside of time. You can run the simulation at 1x speed or 1000x speed, but it makes no difference to the simulated mind, as long as it is isolated from the external world. Even if it was connected to the external world, the fact that it is digital in nature means that save states are possible and there is no longer a linear world line that the digital mind can follow.
And this is why substrate dependence is crucial: everything in the physical world must flow in time, and there is no “going back”. That is, you cannot copy the state of the conscious being, which would be akin to time travel. Digital minds lie outside of time.
So how do we address the fading qualia argument? Well the entire argument falls apart at step one: namely they would be functionally equivalent. Nonsense, they are not equivalent for the most important feature: for something to be digital means perfect knowledge of the state. Perfect knowledge of the state is not a feature of base reality, but is an abstraction layer that lies in a Platonic realm. Having digital neurons is equivalent to the statement that time travel is possible from a subjective point of view.
Of course, this has no bearing on whether or not these minds can act on the world, just that they would not experience time or have subjective experience.
This is missing a key feature of substrate dependence, namely the role of time in the universe. What is implicit in the substrate, is that it exists in the universe. By existing in the universe, it must “flow” through time. And it is this connection to time that is key to its role in consciousness.
Take the standard thought experiment of a simulated digital mind. Is this mind conscious? Well here is the thing about “digital existence”: it lies outside of time. You can run the simulation at 1x speed or 1000x speed, but it makes no difference to the simulated mind, as long as it is isolated from the external world. Even if it was connected to the external world, the fact that it is digital in nature means that save states are possible and there is no longer a linear world line that the digital mind can follow.
And this is why substrate dependence is crucial: everything in the physical world must flow in time, and there is no “going back”. That is, you cannot copy the state of the conscious being, which would be akin to time travel. Digital minds lie outside of time.
So how do we address the fading qualia argument? Well the entire argument falls apart at step one: namely they would be functionally equivalent. Nonsense, they are not equivalent for the most important feature: for something to be digital means perfect knowledge of the state. Perfect knowledge of the state is not a feature of base reality, but is an abstraction layer that lies in a Platonic realm. Having digital neurons is equivalent to the statement that time travel is possible from a subjective point of view.
Of course, this has no bearing on whether or not these minds can act on the world, just that they would not experience time or have subjective experience.