This post crystallizes some arguments I’ve been trying to make in decision theory. Certain representations of decision theory suggest that propositions (or “events”) get values, but I’ve thought that only “states” (maximal descriptions of the complete state of the world) should get values. Their position, as far as I can tell, comes down to thinking that since every proposition has an expected value, we can use this as the value of the proposition. Thinking of this as a type error cuts right through that. (ps, I’m a philosopher too, arguing against some other philosophers—I don’t think there’s a disciplinary boundary issue here, though perhaps some disciplines are more likely to think of these things one way than another)
This post crystallizes some arguments I’ve been trying to make in decision theory. Certain representations of decision theory suggest that propositions (or “events”) get values, but I’ve thought that only “states” (maximal descriptions of the complete state of the world) should get values. Their position, as far as I can tell, comes down to thinking that since every proposition has an expected value, we can use this as the value of the proposition. Thinking of this as a type error cuts right through that. (ps, I’m a philosopher too, arguing against some other philosophers—I don’t think there’s a disciplinary boundary issue here, though perhaps some disciplines are more likely to think of these things one way than another)