After some thought, I do agree that a parliament is important at the very least in practice, and probably in theory as well. And that this does lead to a large bid for normal causal reasoning.
But I think there are ways to make this compatible with my intuition that freak observers and cooperation matter a lot for acausal reasons—e.g. if I have a faction in my moral parliament that cares about my freak observer selves (not about freak observers in general), or if I have one that cares about the part of the global multiversal hedonic utility that I specifically can affect (i.e. the small fraction that I can affect by cooperating more). Those are pretty natural IMO, and would also bid very strongly for my current actions. But I guess they’re more indexed on myself / selfish than anything you’re doing? Unsure.
Or maybe this is better: I could actually just have a parliament for theories about the world or broad worldviews, since that also avoids fanaticism (this is more geometric rationality flavored, I think?). And my “moral value” is just doing the impartial good / right thing in some vague way. This feels more natural anyway since moral values are deeply bound up in worldviews and perceptions of what the world is like.
Then, if I gain a lot of confidence in the worldview of a multiverse, it can bid with decent strength for a lot of broad cooperation and not forcing things.
(the difference with the moral parliament picture is that it feels more natural that a holistic worldview can bid with some strength even if I am small relative to the world in that worldview (because holistic worldviews don’t generally tell you that you don’t matter, i.e. there’s a sort of minimum meaningfulness of your actions). Unlike a utility function over the multiverse, which might not care about my actions at all).
So this would avoid standard fanaticism (Pascal’s mugging) while still being able to appreciate the predominance of freak observers. I kinda like this.
Cool, gotcha.
After some thought, I do agree that a parliament is important at the very least in practice, and probably in theory as well. And that this does lead to a large bid for normal causal reasoning.
But I think there are ways to make this compatible with my intuition that freak observers and cooperation matter a lot for acausal reasons—e.g. if I have a faction in my moral parliament that cares about my freak observer selves (not about freak observers in general), or if I have one that cares about the part of the global multiversal hedonic utility that I specifically can affect (i.e. the small fraction that I can affect by cooperating more). Those are pretty natural IMO, and would also bid very strongly for my current actions. But I guess they’re more indexed on myself / selfish than anything you’re doing? Unsure.Or maybe this is better: I could actually just have a parliament for theories about the world or broad worldviews, since that also avoids fanaticism (this is more geometric rationality flavored, I think?). And my “moral value” is just doing the impartial good / right thing in some vague way. This feels more natural anyway since moral values are deeply bound up in worldviews and perceptions of what the world is like.
Then, if I gain a lot of confidence in the worldview of a multiverse, it can bid with decent strength for a lot of broad cooperation and not forcing things.
(the difference with the moral parliament picture is that it feels more natural that a holistic worldview can bid with some strength even if I am small relative to the world in that worldview (because holistic worldviews don’t generally tell you that you don’t matter, i.e. there’s a sort of minimum meaningfulness of your actions). Unlike a utility function over the multiverse, which might not care about my actions at all).
So this would avoid standard fanaticism (Pascal’s mugging) while still being able to appreciate the predominance of freak observers. I kinda like this.