I think Drexler had a good discussion of this point. Paraphrasing, it’s not so much an axis as that. Naively, for any type of exchange, there’s some ratio of offence to defence costs. And historically, defensive buildout is difficult to distinguish from offensive (this is not always the case, but it is a reasonable first approximation).
But improvements to verification could enable more decoupling of the resources legibly and trustworthily dedicated to defence vs offence: I can prove that what I’m constructing is a defensive-only measure. Thus sufficient defensive buildouts to neutralise observed/anticipated offensive buildouts can be pursued more freely by a community coordinating on this kind of verification even when the cost ratio meaningfully favours destroy.
Then you need to ask what barriers to communication, coordination, and verification might make it difficult to achieve this. And whether there are domains where offence is so cheap as to be practically undefendable. In those cases, you might need to coordinate around tech prevention and mutual restraint instead, or resort to centralisation of the needed authority to achieve safety there.
I think Drexler had a good discussion of this point. Paraphrasing, it’s not so much an axis as that. Naively, for any type of exchange, there’s some ratio of offence to defence costs. And historically, defensive buildout is difficult to distinguish from offensive (this is not always the case, but it is a reasonable first approximation).
But improvements to verification could enable more decoupling of the resources legibly and trustworthily dedicated to defence vs offence: I can prove that what I’m constructing is a defensive-only measure. Thus sufficient defensive buildouts to neutralise observed/anticipated offensive buildouts can be pursued more freely by a community coordinating on this kind of verification even when the cost ratio meaningfully favours destroy.
Then you need to ask what barriers to communication, coordination, and verification might make it difficult to achieve this. And whether there are domains where offence is so cheap as to be practically undefendable. In those cases, you might need to coordinate around tech prevention and mutual restraint instead, or resort to centralisation of the needed authority to achieve safety there.