Yeah I think you’re right. I have the sense that the pure algorithmic account of optimization—that optimization is about algorithms that do search over plans using models derived from evidence to evaluate each plan’s merit—doesn’t quite account for what an optimizer really is in the physical world.
The thing is that I can implement some very general-purpose modelling + plan-search algorithm on my computer (for example, monte carlo versions of AIXI) and hook it up to real sensors and actuators and it will not do anything interesting much at all. It’s too slow and unreflective to really work.
Therefore, an object running a consequentialist computation is definitely not a sufficient condition for remote control as per John’s conjecture, but perhaps it is a necessary condition—that’s what the OP is asking for a proof or disproof of.
Yeah I think you’re right. I have the sense that the pure algorithmic account of optimization—that optimization is about algorithms that do search over plans using models derived from evidence to evaluate each plan’s merit—doesn’t quite account for what an optimizer really is in the physical world.
The thing is that I can implement some very general-purpose modelling + plan-search algorithm on my computer (for example, monte carlo versions of AIXI) and hook it up to real sensors and actuators and it will not do anything interesting much at all. It’s too slow and unreflective to really work.
Therefore, an object running a consequentialist computation is definitely not a sufficient condition for remote control as per John’s conjecture, but perhaps it is a necessary condition—that’s what the OP is asking for a proof or disproof of.