Smaller utilities mean that the “tiny chance times huge utility” sums don’t have the same results as for utilitarians.
Beware Pascal’s wager. Also worthy of note is that Eliezer himself doesn’t gamble on a small probability. But maybe you talked about the difference the egoist could make? Then I agree it amounts to a much smaller probability.
On the other hand, I think the prospect of living a few aeons represents by itself a huge utility, even for an egoist. It might still be worth a long shot.
I would call myself more of an egoist, and I would say the first possibility looks really good and the second possibility looks pretty bad. I of course assume that I am part of the 1%.
Beware Pascal’s wager. Also worthy of note is that Eliezer himself doesn’t gamble on a small probability. But maybe you talked about the difference the egoist could make? Then I agree it amounts to a much smaller probability.
On the other hand, I think the prospect of living a few aeons represents by itself a huge utility, even for an egoist. It might still be worth a long shot.
If an example of where there is a difference would help, consider these two possibilities:
1% of the population takes over the universe;
everyone is obliterated (99% chance) - or “everyone” takes over the universe (1% chance);
To an egoist those two possibilities look about equally bad.
To those whose main concern is existential risk, the second option looks a lot worse.
I would call myself more of an egoist, and I would say the first possibility looks really good and the second possibility looks pretty bad. I of course assume that I am part of the 1%.