Does there exist a relative proportion of N to J where extermination is superior to the status quo, under your assumptions? In theory yes. In reality, it’s so big that you run into a number of practical problems first.
Real Ns would disagree.
They did realize that killing Js wasn’t exactly a nice thing to do. At first they considered relocating Js to some remote land (Madagascar, etc.). When it became apparent thar relocating millions while fighting a world war wasn’t feasible and they resolved to killing them, they had to invent death camps rather than just shooting them because even the SS had problems doing that.
Nevertheless, they had to free the Lebensraum to build the Empire that would Last for a Thousand Years, and if these Js were in the way, well, too bad for them.
I don’t see why utilitarianism should be held accountable for the actions of people who didn’t even particulalry subscribe to it.
They may have not framed the issue explicitely in terms of maximization of an aggregate utility function, but their behavior seems consistent with consequentialist moral reasoning.
Reversed stupidity is not intelligence. That utilitarianism is dangerous in the hands of someone with a poor value function is old news. The reasons why utilitarianism may be correct or not exist in an entirely unrelated argument space.
Ugh so obvious, except I only looked for the help in between making edits, looking for a global thing rather than the (more useful most of the time) local thing.
Why is that relevant? Real Ns weren’t good rationalists after all. If the existence of Js really made them suffer (which it most probably didn’t under any reasonable definition of “suffer”) but they realised that killing Js has negative utility, there were still plenty of superior solutions, e.g.: (1) relocating the Js afer the war (they really didn’t stand in the way), (2) giving all or most Js a new identity (you don’t recognise a J without digging into birth certificates or something; destroying these records and creating strong incentives for the Js to be silent about their origin would work fine), (3) simply stopping the anti-J propaganda which was the leading cause of hatred while being often pursued for reasons unrelated to Js, mostly to foster citizens loyalty to the party by creating an image of an evil enemy.
Of course Ns could have beliefs, and probably a lot of them had beliefs, which somehow excluded these solutions from consideration and therefore justified what they actually did on utilitarian grounds. (Although probably only a minority of Ns were utilitarians). But the original post wasn’t pointing out that utilitarianism could fail horribly when combined with false beliefs and biases. It was rather about the repugnant consequences of scope sensitivity and unbounded utility, even when no false beliefs are involved.
That clause was meant to exclude the possibility of claiming suffering whenever one’s preferences aren’t satisfied. As I have written ‘any reasonable’, I didn’t have one specific definition in mind.
Real Ns would disagree.
They did realize that killing Js wasn’t exactly a nice thing to do. At first they considered relocating Js to some remote land (Madagascar, etc.). When it became apparent thar relocating millions while fighting a world war wasn’t feasible and they resolved to killing them, they had to invent death camps rather than just shooting them because even the SS had problems doing that.
Nevertheless, they had to free the Lebensraum to build the Empire that would Last for a Thousand Years, and if these Js were in the way, well, too bad for them.
Ends before the means: utilitarianism at work.
I don’t see why utilitarianism should be held accountable for the actions of people who didn’t even particulalry subscribe to it.
Also, why are you using N and J to talk about actual Nazis and Jews? That partly defeats the purpose of my making the distinction.
They may have not framed the issue explicitely in terms of maximization of an aggregate utility function, but their behavior seems consistent with consequentialist moral reasoning.
Reversed stupidity is not intelligence. That utilitarianism is dangerous in the hands of someone with a poor value function is old news. The reasons why utilitarianism may be correct or not exist in an entirely unrelated argument space.
click the “Show help” button below the comment box
Ugh so obvious, except I only looked for the help in between making edits, looking for a global thing rather than the (more useful most of the time) local thing.
Thanks!
Why is that relevant? Real Ns weren’t good rationalists after all. If the existence of Js really made them suffer (which it most probably didn’t under any reasonable definition of “suffer”) but they realised that killing Js has negative utility, there were still plenty of superior solutions, e.g.: (1) relocating the Js afer the war (they really didn’t stand in the way), (2) giving all or most Js a new identity (you don’t recognise a J without digging into birth certificates or something; destroying these records and creating strong incentives for the Js to be silent about their origin would work fine), (3) simply stopping the anti-J propaganda which was the leading cause of hatred while being often pursued for reasons unrelated to Js, mostly to foster citizens loyalty to the party by creating an image of an evil enemy.
Of course Ns could have beliefs, and probably a lot of them had beliefs, which somehow excluded these solutions from consideration and therefore justified what they actually did on utilitarian grounds. (Although probably only a minority of Ns were utilitarians). But the original post wasn’t pointing out that utilitarianism could fail horribly when combined with false beliefs and biases. It was rather about the repugnant consequences of scope sensitivity and unbounded utility, even when no false beliefs are involved.
What definition is that?
That clause was meant to exclude the possibility of claiming suffering whenever one’s preferences aren’t satisfied. As I have written ‘any reasonable’, I didn’t have one specific definition in mind.