I think it is important to clarify the meaning of “chance”, as you
refer to it.
If I say that the behavior of a flipped coin is almost certainly
deterministic, the remaining uncertainty is not part of the system, it
is caused by my inability to predict the outcome. This is not the kind
of “chance” that you are referring to.
The type of “chance” related to quantum immortality is the probability
attached to non-zero quantum wave-function amplitudes.
It is not enough for there to be a conceptual “chance” that quantum
wave-functions could influence the outcome of a coin toss. There must
be actual reachable sequences of quantum state sets, all with
non-zero wave-function amplitudes, that result in alternate outcomes.
It may also not be enough to utilize a hypothetical model of the quantum
wave-functions. It may be possible that real low probability
wave-functions don’t result in universe splits. For example, those
world-lines might merge with higher probability world lines, or there
might be resolution limits set by the holographic universe, or by
quantum foam noise.
With these restriction and granting (just for this argument) that the
MWI is the right way to think about the universe, I’ll agree with your
statment:
“even the most infinitesimal chances are guaranteed to come up somewhere.”
I think it is important to clarify the meaning of “chance”, as you refer to it.
If I say that the behavior of a flipped coin is almost certainly deterministic, the remaining uncertainty is not part of the system, it is caused by my inability to predict the outcome. This is not the kind of “chance” that you are referring to.
The type of “chance” related to quantum immortality is the probability attached to non-zero quantum wave-function amplitudes.
It is not enough for there to be a conceptual “chance” that quantum wave-functions could influence the outcome of a coin toss. There must be actual reachable sequences of quantum state sets, all with non-zero wave-function amplitudes, that result in alternate outcomes.
It may also not be enough to utilize a hypothetical model of the quantum wave-functions. It may be possible that real low probability wave-functions don’t result in universe splits. For example, those world-lines might merge with higher probability world lines, or there might be resolution limits set by the holographic universe, or by quantum foam noise.
With these restriction and granting (just for this argument) that the MWI is the right way to think about the universe, I’ll agree with your statment:
I understand this, but thanks for the clarification regardless.