Sure, I will grant that, in certain extreme examples where a person’s specific genome makes them much more anxious and much more depressed, then maybe some unscientific beliefs may improve their day-to-day functioning. But I think overwhelmingly this is not the case, and that while people may suffer from anxiety stress and depression, a greater understanding of reality can help you resolve those problems.
Overwhelmingly, people are born with a knack for science. The natural curiosity of children to explore, touch, smell, taste, and feel are fundamental to scientific inquiry and exploration. Children also possess the same knack for rationality as we do. When a child falls and scrapes himself while running downhill, he learns not to run downhill because he may fall and hurt himself again. He is being a rational agent: he is using prior experience to make predictions for future events. I do not believe that certain people are not “ready for science”; people are born scientists, all use evidence and predictive reasoning in our day to day lives. They are not rigorous scientists and rationalists, but they are scientific and they are rational.
In light of humanities natural curiosity and capacity for rationality; it is unnecessary (or only marginally helpful) to create large and complicated “groupthinks” to persuade people to more rigorous thinking. The best way forward is through honesty (making room for some Noble Lies), and to spark that natural curiosity and wonder that we each have.
That’s a noble ideal, but it doesn’t fit with the data we have. Groupthink isn’t an option, it’s a necessary developmental stage almost everyone goes through, those who don’t being those who’re stuck at a pre-groupthinking cognitive developmental stage. Overcoming groupthink, in turn, requires not only nurture, but also nature, as it seems to require the brain to have the potential for post-groupthink reasoning, which in turn can then be realized.
For information on these numbers, and the studies on it, I suggest you begin by the best experimentally supported of the family of Neo-Piagetian psychological theories, Lawrence Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development, then branch from it. Those will provide you a more solid base on which better fit most of Sagan’s hope, and on what needs done around it for it to, someday, become actually viable.
What data? Where is the evidence? Where is your evidence that your model actually coincides and explains reality? At least Sagan was on the front line of his work; he actually worked with children, he spoke to people, he had direct and personal experience with trying to teach science and rationality. That’s very strong evidence. Is your evidence stronger than Sagans, Feynmans, Dawkins, and Hawkins?
Here are two abstracts from the References section in the link I provided. These, plus the other papers referenced, probably suffice to establish the basis upon which I inferred, although I’m open to suggestions for other, maybe better, ways to generalize it:
“This paper presents the results of a 20-year longitudinal study of moral judgment development. The study represents an attempt to document the basic assumptions of Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental theory of moral judgment. Subjects were 58 boys aged 10, 13, and 16 at time 1 and were approximately equally divided at each age by social class and sociometric status. Sociometric and socioeconomic groups were equalized for intelligence. The study included six testing times-the original interview and five follow-up interviews administered at 3-4-year intervals. At each testing time subjects were individually interviewed on their judgments about nine hypothetical moral dilemmas. Interviews were stage scored according to Forms A, B, and C of the Standard Issue Scoring Manual. All scoring was done blind by individual dilemma. Data are presented on test-retest, alternate form, and interrater reliability for Standard Issue Scoring. Validity of the instrument is discussed. It was found that subjects proceeded through the developmental stages in the hypothesized sequence. No subject skipped a stage in the sequence and only 4% (6) of the adjacent testing times showed downward stage change. This percentage was less than downward change on test-retest data. Moral judgment interviews also showed a high degree of internal consistency in stage scores assigned with the great majority of the interviews receiving all their scores at two adjacent stages. Factor analyses by dilemma and moral issue showed a single general moral stage factor. Moral judgment was found to be positively correlated with age, socio-economic status, IQ, and education. Stage scores in childhood were significantly correlated with adulthood scores. The results of this study were interpreted as being consistent with a cognitive-developmental stage model. Subjects seemed to use a coherent structural orientation in thinking about a variety of moral dilemmas. Their thinking developed in a regular sequence of stages, neither skipping a stage nor reverting to use of a prior stage. The Standard Issue Scoring System was found to be reliable, and it was concluded that it provides a valid measure of Kohlberg’s moral judgment stages.”
“Several issues concerning Gilligan’s model of moral orientations and Kohlberg’s models of moral stages and moral orientations were examined in a longitudinal study with 233 subjects (from 78 families) who ranged in age from 5 to 63 years. They participated in 2 identical interviews separated by a 2-year interval. In each interview, they discussed hypothetical dilemmas and a personally generated real-life dilemma, which were scored for both moral stage and moral orientation (both Gilligan’s and Kohlberg’s typologies). Results revealed few violations of the stage sequence over the longitudinal interval, supporting Kohlberg’s moral stage model. Sex differences were almost completely absent for both Gilligan’s and Kohlberg’s moral orientations, although there were clear developmental trends. Hypothetical and real-life dilemmas elicited different moral orientations, especially in terms of Kohlberg’s typology. The interrelations between the 2 models of moral orientations were generally weak, indicating that they are not synonymous.”
-- Walker, Lawrence, J. (February 1989). A longitudinal study of moral reasoning. Child Development. 60 (1): 157–166. doi:10.2307/1131081. JSTOR 1131081. PMID 2702866.
Kohlberg’s developmental stages theory is one of the most tested, subjected to falsification attempts, and well corroborated psychological theories of the last 60 years. Knowing it, and how the stages are distributed (among adults it follows a normal distribution), provides a solid auxiliary reference point to, e.g., reasonings based on IQ distribution, and what it implies for rationality efforts and related subject areas.
Now, I don’t actually know whether Sagan, Feynman, Dawkins, or Hawkins incorporated the results of modern, well supported Neo-Piagetian studies such as Kohlberg’s in their own psycho-social models and proposal. Maybe they did, and those results are already accounted for in their reasoning. But if they didn’t, then I think we may think of those proposals as lacking key information and, by extension, effectiveness.
It seems Kohlberg is primarily concerned with moral/cultural behaviour, what an individual may think is the right thing to do. Undeniably the desire to follow the group is strong. What is the relevance in the context of teaching rationality and scientific skepticism? No doubt, if your local environment teaches that science and rationality are weird and strange, and you’re a nerd for attempting it learn it, there exists social pressure against learning science. But I still can’t escape the fact that the great majority of people are attempting science and rationality in their daily lives, though with much less precision. The status quo can increase the barrier of entry for certain sects of knowledge, but people are still learning in their daily lives through their failures and experiences. I don’t see the relevance of a study on group based(tribe/political) thinking in the endeavour of trying to teach science and rationality; in effect trying to teach science and rationality is just trying to change the status quo of the group.
Undeniably the desire to follow the group is strong.
The study about cognitive stages points that they’re much stronger than a desire. They’re the way a person’s brain is wired at every point of their development. Someone at a stage ‘n’ literally feels, perceives and interacts the world that way. They may know, by descriptions from others, or, if they have a very high IQ, through observation of patterns in others, that others feel, perceive and interact with the world in different ways, but this is, for them, merely a piece of data, not something they can act upon, except for one instance: that of trying hard to grow into the stage immediately above one’s own. But there’s no guarantee of success in this, as it seems there are biological limitations to this. It’d be like trying hard to grow another 5 IQ points: unless you already have some untapped potential to do this, it simply isn’t possible.
What is the relevance in the context of teaching rationality and scientific skepticism?
This teaching would need to be split into at least 4 different layers: a new one for high IQ individuals at stage 2; another for individuals at stage 3; another for those at stage 4; and finally the current one, which is more appropriate for individuals at stage 5 -- which, incidentally, is the stage most rationalists are at, hence their bias in producing content mostly appropriate and convincing to others at their own stage.
(...) in effect trying to teach science and rationality is just trying to change the status quo of the group.
That’s precisely why it’s ineffective. Stages 5 and 6 comprise about 6% of the population. Therefore, even if current rationality teaching methods were perfectly effective, reaching and influencing all of its target audience, that’d mean a world with 6% of actual rationalists. Plus a varying contingent of stages 2 to 4 non-actually-rationalists “groupthink-influenced” by those rationalists in an indirect, ad hoc manner, rather than through actual rationality training and adoption, since such a direct approach, targeted at those stages, their strengths and weaknesses, is neither available, nor being pursued.
Sure, I will grant that, in certain extreme examples where a person’s specific genome makes them much more anxious and much more depressed, then maybe some unscientific beliefs may improve their day-to-day functioning. But I think overwhelmingly this is not the case, and that while people may suffer from anxiety stress and depression, a greater understanding of reality can help you resolve those problems.
Overwhelmingly, people are born with a knack for science. The natural curiosity of children to explore, touch, smell, taste, and feel are fundamental to scientific inquiry and exploration. Children also possess the same knack for rationality as we do. When a child falls and scrapes himself while running downhill, he learns not to run downhill because he may fall and hurt himself again. He is being a rational agent: he is using prior experience to make predictions for future events. I do not believe that certain people are not “ready for science”; people are born scientists, all use evidence and predictive reasoning in our day to day lives. They are not rigorous scientists and rationalists, but they are scientific and they are rational.
In light of humanities natural curiosity and capacity for rationality; it is unnecessary (or only marginally helpful) to create large and complicated “groupthinks” to persuade people to more rigorous thinking. The best way forward is through honesty (making room for some Noble Lies), and to spark that natural curiosity and wonder that we each have.
Source: https://www.amazon.com/Demon-Haunted-World-Science-Candle-Dark/dp/0345409469
That’s a noble ideal, but it doesn’t fit with the data we have. Groupthink isn’t an option, it’s a necessary developmental stage almost everyone goes through, those who don’t being those who’re stuck at a pre-groupthinking cognitive developmental stage. Overcoming groupthink, in turn, requires not only nurture, but also nature, as it seems to require the brain to have the potential for post-groupthink reasoning, which in turn can then be realized.
For information on these numbers, and the studies on it, I suggest you begin by the best experimentally supported of the family of Neo-Piagetian psychological theories, Lawrence Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development, then branch from it. Those will provide you a more solid base on which better fit most of Sagan’s hope, and on what needs done around it for it to, someday, become actually viable.
What data? Where is the evidence? Where is your evidence that your model actually coincides and explains reality? At least Sagan was on the front line of his work; he actually worked with children, he spoke to people, he had direct and personal experience with trying to teach science and rationality. That’s very strong evidence. Is your evidence stronger than Sagans, Feynmans, Dawkins, and Hawkins?
Here are two abstracts from the References section in the link I provided. These, plus the other papers referenced, probably suffice to establish the basis upon which I inferred, although I’m open to suggestions for other, maybe better, ways to generalize it:
-- Colby, Anne; Gibbs, J.; Lieberman, M.; Kohlberg, L. (1983). A Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment: A Monograph for the Society of Research in Child Development. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-99932-7-870-2.
-- Walker, Lawrence, J. (February 1989). A longitudinal study of moral reasoning. Child Development. 60 (1): 157–166. doi:10.2307/1131081. JSTOR 1131081. PMID 2702866.
Kohlberg’s developmental stages theory is one of the most tested, subjected to falsification attempts, and well corroborated psychological theories of the last 60 years. Knowing it, and how the stages are distributed (among adults it follows a normal distribution), provides a solid auxiliary reference point to, e.g., reasonings based on IQ distribution, and what it implies for rationality efforts and related subject areas.
Now, I don’t actually know whether Sagan, Feynman, Dawkins, or Hawkins incorporated the results of modern, well supported Neo-Piagetian studies such as Kohlberg’s in their own psycho-social models and proposal. Maybe they did, and those results are already accounted for in their reasoning. But if they didn’t, then I think we may think of those proposals as lacking key information and, by extension, effectiveness.
It seems Kohlberg is primarily concerned with moral/cultural behaviour, what an individual may think is the right thing to do. Undeniably the desire to follow the group is strong. What is the relevance in the context of teaching rationality and scientific skepticism? No doubt, if your local environment teaches that science and rationality are weird and strange, and you’re a nerd for attempting it learn it, there exists social pressure against learning science. But I still can’t escape the fact that the great majority of people are attempting science and rationality in their daily lives, though with much less precision. The status quo can increase the barrier of entry for certain sects of knowledge, but people are still learning in their daily lives through their failures and experiences. I don’t see the relevance of a study on group based(tribe/political) thinking in the endeavour of trying to teach science and rationality; in effect trying to teach science and rationality is just trying to change the status quo of the group.
The study about cognitive stages points that they’re much stronger than a desire. They’re the way a person’s brain is wired at every point of their development. Someone at a stage ‘n’ literally feels, perceives and interacts the world that way. They may know, by descriptions from others, or, if they have a very high IQ, through observation of patterns in others, that others feel, perceive and interact with the world in different ways, but this is, for them, merely a piece of data, not something they can act upon, except for one instance: that of trying hard to grow into the stage immediately above one’s own. But there’s no guarantee of success in this, as it seems there are biological limitations to this. It’d be like trying hard to grow another 5 IQ points: unless you already have some untapped potential to do this, it simply isn’t possible.
This teaching would need to be split into at least 4 different layers: a new one for high IQ individuals at stage 2; another for individuals at stage 3; another for those at stage 4; and finally the current one, which is more appropriate for individuals at stage 5 -- which, incidentally, is the stage most rationalists are at, hence their bias in producing content mostly appropriate and convincing to others at their own stage.
That’s precisely why it’s ineffective. Stages 5 and 6 comprise about 6% of the population. Therefore, even if current rationality teaching methods were perfectly effective, reaching and influencing all of its target audience, that’d mean a world with 6% of actual rationalists. Plus a varying contingent of stages 2 to 4 non-actually-rationalists “groupthink-influenced” by those rationalists in an indirect, ad hoc manner, rather than through actual rationality training and adoption, since such a direct approach, targeted at those stages, their strengths and weaknesses, is neither available, nor being pursued.